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ABSTRACT 
 
By sending peacekeeping and observer missions to the world’s troubled spots over the past 
seventy years, the United Nations (UN) has devoted its attention and resources to promoting 
living standards and human rights throughout the world. Despite this, the peacekeeping 
missions often fail to establish peace in a turbulent region. What dynamics play into the strategy 
of the peacekeepers? How can a peacekeeping effort use its limited resources to increase its 
chances of success? This study evaluates 56 completed peacekeeping missions and highlights 
the most important factors that contribute to their outcome. The analysis has two phases. 
Firstly, it will separate each peacekeeping operation into successful and failed sections. This is 
conducted by assessing each case’s achievements based on three criteria: implementation of 
mandate, establishment of order, and procurement of long-lasting peace. The second phase of 
the study proposes five hypotheses that will bring to light the most important factors that 
contribute to the outcome of the mission. Those factors are not based on the actions of the 
peacekeepers, but rather on the conditions they were given to succeed. The findings are 
important to anyone who must understand what aspects drive the peacekeepers toward eventual 
success or failure. The results can also simplify past peacekeeping dilemmas and can be applied 
to improve the dynamics of on-going and future missions. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 OVERVIEW  
Peacekeeping operations became one of the most prevalent forms of conflict 
resolution in the modern era. Particularly since the post-Cold War era, many conflicts have 
been ended through UN mediation or the action of third parties operating conjointly. Three 
basic principles have traditionally served the UN peacekeeping operations: consent of the 
parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate. 
At the onset of the conflict, peacekeeping forces have numerous challenges that will define 
the operation’s outcome as a success or failure. To deploy the UN peacekeeping forces, the 
Security Council must take in consideration a set of factors that will be applied to implement 
the potential objectives of the mission. One of the emerging questions is, what dynamics play 
into a successful strategy of the peacekeepers? How can the peacekeepers improve their 
course of actions during the operation? 
This thesis highlights some of the most important criteria that define the success of 
the mission and brings to light the key factors that contribute to those criteria. The three 
criteria that this thesis uses to assess the mission are implementation of mandate, 
establishment of order, and procurement of long-lasting peace. The results of this project 
shows that one of the most notable factors of the peacekeeping success is the ability to adapt 
the mandate in accordance to the changing situation in the conflicting area. On the other 
hand, it also shows that the presence of other peacekeeping forces, for example NATO or 
OSCE, does not influence the outcome of the UN mission per se. Beyond the dynamics of the 
three success criteria, this study used a qualitative approach to demonstrate the “causal 
recipes” that explain the outcome of a peacekeeping operation. In addition, the results 
showed that the peacekeepers strongly require a safe haven to operate effectively. 
Furthermore, this study demonstrates that the peacekeepers are not in such need of generous 
financing, but more of the suitably trained and coordinated personnel. The methodology used 
in this thesis uses two overarching procedures: the quantitative and qualitative approaches. A 
set-theoretic approach that uses 56 UN peacekeeping missions and 13 independent variable 
Andrej Sagaidak  SVF-3901 
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indicators will show the correlation between the success and failure factors.1 The 13 
variable factors are listed and explained in Table 8 in Chapter 3. These findings are important 
to anyone who must understand what actions drive a peacekeeping mission to an eventual 
success or failure. The findings can provide useful information to explain past mission and 
suggest what can be improved in the on-going or future peacekeeping efforts.  
1.2  PURPOSE  
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the dynamics of all the completed 
peacekeeping operations and to determine what practices affected the outcome of the conflict. 
By conducting a historical analysis of the cases of peacekeeping missions since the 
establishment of the UN, this thesis correlates common features that may lead to either 
mission success or failure. What factors have had an impact on the outcome of the conflict? 
What conditions are most essential for the peacekeeping missions outcome? Ultimately, this 
thesis seeks to identify key features from past cases of peacekeeping operations by using both 
qualitative and quantitative approaches. Although the findings may be valuable to 
policymakers, strategists, and academics, the primarily target audience are the UN 
peacekeeping planners who must understand what factors drive a peacekeeping operation 
toward success. Eventually, the findings will provide the UN with an in-depth understanding 
of the operating environment surrounding peacekeeping missions.  
Most peacekeeping-centred research projects face challenges identifying the root 
causes of successfully defusing a conflict. Those studies seek to identify several issues. The 
first issue is why the peacekeepers succeed in some environments, while in other under 
conflicts with similar features, they failed. The second is what are the criteria to determine 
the success of the operation. Both approaches seek to draw insight from past missions and 
conflicts to predict the course of the future operation by focusing on observed pre-existing 
conditions. This thesis will not predict where will the next UN peacekeeping operation be 
deployed or how to stop a potential conflict in the future; several other researchers have 
covered this topic.2 Instead, this study looks closely at each completed operation to determine 
how peacekeepers succeed to implement their given tasks. For the UN planners, this 
                                                          
1 The set-theoretic methods are processes used to study social reality through the idea if sets and their specific 
outcomes. See, Carsten Q. Schneider and Claudius Wagemann, Set-Theoretic Methods for the Social Sciences: A 
Guide to Qualitative Comparative Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).   
2 See Tabler, Andrew J. "Syria's Collapse: And How Washington Can Stop It." Foreign Aff. 92 (2013): 90. and 
Allison, Graham. "How to stop nuclear terror." Foreign Aff. 83 (2004): 64. 
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approach will highlight the priorities that are most influential to develop a conflict resolution 
effort.   
Recommendations of this thesis will come in the form of planning considerations for 
UN peacekeeping planners. These considerations are not intended to be a set of stand-alone 
tools, rather they should be used in conjunction with other peacekeeping planner resources. 
This will improve the understanding of any peacekeeping operations environment. However, 
the applicability may diverge under different circumstances and geography, which would 
require planners to redetermine their approaches. Therefore, this thesis will attempt to make 
future analysis more complete. Additionally, a proper evaluation of peace operation success 
would result in several policymaking benefits. Firstly, it would provide a prerequisite for 
valid interferences concerning what conditions are associated with success. Secondly, it 
would give a broader, multifaceted assessment of peace operations. Lastly, it will give 
opportunities for a necessary baseline upon which to make real-time judgements and 
accompanying policy changes. Ultimately, by specifying what constitutes success of a 
peacekeeping operation, we can set a prerequisite for theoretical development. 
1.3  SCOPE OF WORK 
The UN Security Council approved 71 peacekeeping missions since 1948. The 
operations’ purposes varied in terms of their mandate and scope. Some missions are archived 
under several categories. For example, conflict prevention, peace-making, peacekeeping, and 
peace enforcement are recipes of the UN to maintain peace and security around the world. 
Yet, if those recipes are combined with unsystematic partial measures or with slow response, 
the missions could “fail to provide the comprehensive approach required to address the root 
causes of conflict and hence reduce the risk of conflict recurring.”3 Consequently, such 
practices will taint the UN’s reputation and affect the deployment of future operations. 
Therefore, there is a need of an in-depth and in-breadth updated knowledge of the 
geographical, political, and social situation of the conflicting region before, during and 
potentially after deploying the peacekeepers.   
Figure 1 shows the locations of all the 71 UN peacekeeping operations. This study 
excluded the 15 ongoing missions from the analysis because they would require a different 
                                                          
3 Peacekeeping.un.org, Terminology accessed on 04/05/2019, available at: 
https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/terminology  
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approach to determine their outcomes. The 56 finished operations analysed in this study are 
divided into successful and failed cases.  
 
Figure 1 UN map showing 70 years of peacekeeping across four continents4 
 
The cases in each section are presented chronologically by start and finish date. This 
thesis does not focus on a universal set of specific methods to evaluate the success of a UN 
mission, but it combines numerous studies and extracts the most applicable criteria for each 
case. Data for the case studies come from secondary sources. The analyses of each case study 
were based on available English-language history and secondary analysis of the peacekeeping 
operations. Documentation proved voluminous for some cases and much scarcer for other 
cases. Yet, for all the cases the available information was sufficient to meet the criteria 
predetermined to evaluate each peacekeeping operation. The references under each case 
demonstrate the range and depth of the available literature. Specifically, the criteria used to 
evaluate the success or failure of the operations were extracted from the Oxford Handbook 
for UN Peacekeeping Operations, Paul F. Diehl and Daniel Druckman’s Evaluating Peace 
Operations, and other publications. The key facts of each operation, for example, the 
maximum amount of deployed personnel, overall financing, and fatalities were taken from 
official UN webpages.5 The discussion of the relationships between this section’s presented 
concepts, factors and case outcomes are offered in the “Discussion” chapter. 
                                                          
4 Un.org UN Peacekeeping: 70 years of service and sacrifice. 2016 Accessed on 03/05/2019, available at: 
https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/un-peacekeeping-70-years-of-service-sacrifice  
5 There are various official UN sources that provide information regarding its peacekeeping missions, some of 
which are: UN.org, peacekeeping.un.org, unmissions.org 
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1.3.1 Research questions 
The research question of this thesis revolves around what constitutes to the success of 
a UN peacekeeping operation. By examining 56 UN peacekeeping operations, this thesis 
correlates the common conditions that lead to a peacekeeping operation success or failure. By 
analysing the history of the missions, the question that this thesis will try to answer include:  
• What factors and conditions led to the operation’s success?  
• What shortcomings and limitations led to the mission’s failure?  
• Are there similarities among peacekeeping successes and failures, or each one 
is exceptional?  
• What cultural, geopolitical and economic features should be taken under 
consideration? 
 
a. What does the literature say about peacekeeping operations? 
From the military standpoint, this study does not provide information on how to 
prevent a conflict, but it is focused on how conflicts are mediated. Surely, conflict prevention 
is a nominal field of research. Yet, the literature on insurgencies and modern warfare is 
extremely diverse and there is no single approach for resolving a conflict. For this reason, this 
thesis’s theory tries to distance itself from being a collection of hunches, existing hypotheses, 
or normative preferences. Instead, it focuses on the practices based on empirical evidence. In 
addition, lessons about peace operation successes depend fundamentally on one or several 
yardsticks used to evaluate the process. Therefore, studies that use different benchmarks for 
success may reach different or even opposite conclusions, which can undermine the 
evaluation factors. As Diehl and Druckman stress, “allowing peacekeepers to use offensive 
military tactics, or permissive rules of engagement, could help secure areas and prevent 
human rights abuses […] but increase civilian casualties”6 Those criteria can be identified as 
success and at the same time—as failure. This is why one of this thesis’s aims is to determine 
what criteria has more value than the other, given the circumstances of each case.  
                                                          
6 Diehl & Druckman p. 5 
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The fundamental criteria to determine the peacekeeping success was noted by Paul 
Diehl in International Peacekeeping, which are: the implementation of mandate and 
establishment of order.7  
In a similar fashion, political science professor Duane Bratt defined three other 
criteria in 1996: facilitation of conflict resolution, conflict containment from future 
escalation, and limitation of casualties.8 Today, Bratt’s approach is widely outdated in 
comparison to some other scholars’ studies. For example, consultant for peace operations Jair 
van der Lijn defined nine criteria to evaluate the United Nation Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). 
Those criteria are:  
1. The parties are sincere and willing to cooperate with the operation’s enactment; 
2. The operation can enforce an efficient sense of security for both parties; 
3. The operation has enough attention to the causes of conflict both in depth and in 
breadth; 
4. The operation receives assistance and cooperation from important outside actors 
and organisations; 
5. The operation is implemented at the right time and place; 
6. The operation is supported by competent staff under competent leadership, with 
clear command structures; 
7. The operation has a long-term commitment; 
8. The operation’s actions and the ‘policy tools’ are coordinated within the 
operation, as well as supported externally; 
9. The operation provides ‘ownership,’ in terms of persuasion responsibility, and 
obligation.9  
Although all van der Lijn’s nine criteria are applicable to most of the UN operations, 
the scholar himself acknowledged that the first two are the most essential.10 Yet, he also 
stressed that while the implementation of the first two criteria is essential, the long-term 
commitment to peace also plays a nominal role in defining the mission’s success. 
                                                          
7 Diehl, Paul F. "International peacekeeping (Perspectives on security)." Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
Univ. Press 3 (1993): 34. 
8 Bratt, Duane. "Assessing the success of UN peacekeeping operations." International Peacekeeping 3, 
no. 4 (1996): 64-81. 
9 A similar evaluation was conducted by Van der Lijn, Jaïr. "Success and failure of UN peacekeeping 
operations: UNMIS in Sudan." Journal of International Peacekeeping 14, no. 1-2 (2010): 27-59. 
10 Van der Lijn (2010): 59 
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Furthermore, failing to scale the significance of other factors could lead policymaker to 
implement certain damaging regulations, leading to distressing long-term consequences. For 
instance, slow economic recovery can be the result from devoting too much attention to 
security matters. This was evident in the case of the lengthy 1999-2010 UN Organization 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). Indeed, Democratic Republic 
of Congo’s (DRC) gross domestic product (GDP) has decreased ever since the mission’s 
deployment.11 Surely, the deployment of the peacekeepers would not be the reason for capital 
stagnation, but their actions could have contributed more to improve it. Figure 2 shows 
DRC’s GDP per capita decline between 1989-2009. 
 
Figure 2: DRC’s gap in per capita GDP 1989-2009 
 
A notable research was also conducted by international relations professor Darya 
Pushkina who analysed another peacekeeping effort in Congo, the 1960-1964 UN Operation 
in the Congo (ONUC). The mission can be considered an overall success by Diehl’s 
standards, as ONUC’s mandate implementation was successful and the recurrence of war was 
prevented due to order of security forces in the area. Yet, the conflict spread beyond the 
borders of the country. Therefore, it was noted by Pushkina that “judging success based on 
mandate fulfilment and concentrating only on a small set of potential factors for success may 
ultimately be of little value in making general claims about UN peacekeeping.”12 As contrary 
                                                          
11 Bove, Vincenzo, and Leandro Elia. "Economic Development in Peacekeeping Host 
Countries." CESifo Economic Studies 64, no. 4 (2017): 718 
12 Pushkina (2006): 147 
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to interstate disputes, civil wars may require more weight on Lijn’s seventh factor “The 
operation has a long-term commitment.” Indeed, if tensions reoccur in the aftermath of the 
peacekeeping mission, its mediation efforts would be entirely compromised. Therefore, this 
study adds the procurance of long-lasting peace to Diehl’s implementation of mandate and 
establishment of order criteria to evaluate the 56 missions.  
b. What are the gaps in the literature? 
It is evident from the literature covered in the previous section that more research 
must be conducted towards understanding the dynamics of peacekeeping operations. The 
literature above may answer the question on how a peacekeeping mission should be 
evaluated, but they do not reveal how those same factors work on a broader scale of 
peacekeeping around the world. Indeed, as this study suggests, dynamics change throughout 
time, so the UNSC must be ready to provide the necessary conditions for the peacekeepers to 
adapt to the changes of the situation. Benjamin de Carvalho and Ingrid Aune argue that 
despite the rapid growth of financial and logistical features of the peacekeeping operations, 
“few studies of the overall effects of this shift towards greater accountability have been 
published, and the literature addressing this shift is scant.”13 Therefore, this study also tries to 
address the evolving nature of evaluative standards to highlight the best practical measures of 
success criteria of the peacekeeping efforts. 
One notable study that identifies the evolving nature of the assessing methods is 
Evaluating Peace Operations by Paul F. Diehl and Daniel Druckman. They answer the 
question of what explains the great divergence in assessment. The scholars suggest that 
“much depends on the standards used to evaluate peace missions, as well as evidence used to 
make judgements according to those standards.”14 Furthermore, by following one set of 
criteria for determining what constitutes success or failure in peace operations we would fail 
to build a general outline for making good policy choices for conflict resolution. Similarly, 
Charles Hauss in International Conflict Resolution argues that there is no blueprint for 
conflict resolution. The author stresses that “[c]onsider, for example, that the parties involved 
                                                          
13 de Carvalho, Benjamin, and Ingrid J. Aune. "Assessing Complex Peace Operations. Some 
Considerations of Methodology and Procedure." (2010). P.5 
14 Diehl & Druckman 2010 p. 1 
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in the conflict in South Africa all agreed that they had to share the same territory. Such an 
agreement has not been in place for most of the history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.”15 
Therefore, we must take note that despite the centrality of certain evaluations, the 
literature on peacekeeping and related peace mission is not well developed. Diehl and 
Druckman also note that excessive attention has been given to “inputs (or independent 
variables) in peace operation studies, and considerably less (if at all) is given to the outcomes 
(or dependent variables).”16 Hence, this thesis will firstly incline its attention by defining the 
dependent variable of success or failure of a peacekeeping mission based on three of the 
arguably most important criteria. Those are implementation of mandate, establishment of 
order, and procurement of long-lasting peace. Secondly, it produces 13 independent variables 
developed from the five hypotheses. The study will illustrate how those 13 factors contribute 
to the three criteria and determine which ones are more influential than others.  
1.3.2 Hypotheses 
This thesis separates the theories discussed in the previous literature review into five 
hypotheses. Each unit focuses on a specific peacekeeping dynamic that to a certain degree 
may affect the outcome of the operation. Therefore, the primary focus of this thesis is to test 
the validity of each premise. The five hypotheses can respectively be defined by five 
compositions of words: safe haven, amount of personnel, amount of financing, efficient 
timing, and external support. A more detailed explanation of the thesis can be found below. 
• Hypothesis 1, The peacekeepers require a safe haven from which to operate.   
• Hypothesis 2, An ample amount of financing does not necessary lead to the mission’s 
success. 
• Hypothesis 3, The mission needs a sufficient and appropriate amount of personnel 
• Hypothesis 4, The longer duration of the mission does not necessarily mean the 
success of the mission 
• Hypothesis 5, External support and cooperation with other peacekeeping organisations 
is necessary to ensure the success of the mission 
The above hypotheses do not focus on the actions conducted by the peacekeepers. 
Instead, they focus on the provisional aspects of each operation. To determine the validity of 
                                                          
15 Hauss, Charles. International Conflict Resolution 2nd Ed. A&C Black, 2010: 202 
16 Diehl & Druckman 2010 p. 1 
Andrej Sagaidak  SVF-3901 
10 
 
each hypotheses, this study takes information from secondary sources. Those sources provide 
a detailed information for each hypothesis’s factor. For example, to answer the first 
hypothesis, regarding whether the peacekeepers were operating in a safe haven, this study 
uses numerous secondary articles and books that specify the degree of danger that the 
peacekeepers were operating in. For example, UNOSOM II had an extremely hostile 
environment for the peacekeepers, who were also considered by certain armed groups as part 
of the conflict.17 Hence, the peacekeepers experienced 147 casualties. In addition, the official 
UN sources provide detailed information on the quantity of personnel deployed, and the 
maximum amount of finances attributed to each operation. Furthermore, available copies of 
resolutions of mandate amendments, and presence of another peacekeeping organisation 
cooperating with the UN peacekeepers help answer the other hypotheses of this thesis. A 
similar study was conducted by Watkins, but instead of peacekeeping operations,he analysed 
modern insurgencies. Watkins notes that “insurgent actions have little influence on the 
outcome of an insurgency.”18 Indeed, this study also argues that the actions of the 
peacekeepers have little to do with the mission’s outcome. Instead, it focuses on the 
conditions that are provided and approved by the UN Security Council (UNSC). Therefore, it 
is important to determine and calculate the independent variable of the operation, which 
eventually reveal how each of those factors contributed to the dependant variable (success or 
failure).  
1.3.3 Methodology 
This thesis uses both qualitative and quantitative approaches to determine whether 
there is a causal relationship between the aspects of the peacekeeping forces and the outcome 
using a set-theoretic analysis method. The main aim of the study analyses the factors that 
determine the peacekeeping mission’s success. The data correlation, using 13 independent 
variables will determine how a peacekeeping operation performed and reveal a set of recipes 
and determine how peacekeepers can use their resources in the best way. This thesis will 
firstly identify the success or failure outcomes for each UN peacekeeping operation. 
Secondly, it will compare the existing facts, for example, the maximum deployed personnel, 
and overall budget spent per each operation. Then, the two sections of successful and failed 
                                                          
17 Williams, Paul D. "UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)." In The Oxford Handbook of UN 
Peacekeeping Operations. 2015. P.5 
18 Watkins, Christopher L. How insurgents win: examining the dynamics of modern insurgencies. 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA, 2014. P.13 
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operations will show how amount of personnel and budget affected the operation’s outcome. 
Moreover, the study identifies whether the peacekeepers operated in a safe haven, and 
whether they work alongside other peacekeeping forces, for example, those of NATO or the 
EU. 
a. Dependent variables 
The primary dependent variables for this thesis are the outcomes of each 
peacekeeping operation. The cases are categorised in terms of either success of failure. Many 
cases produced complicated outcomes, so they required a certain degree of improvisation to 
assess the outcome. For example, when the operation had a highly limited mandate with 
insufficient resources to procure a peaceful environment for the local population, for example 
UNOMUR in Rwanda, the case is considered a failure. On the other hand, if the operation 
was also extremely small, for example UNTMIH in Haiti, but it set the ground for the next 
successful bigger mission, the case is also considered a success. Figure 4 illustrates the logic 
behind how each case was evaluated. Similarly, Paul et al. use insurgent win or loss variables 
during COIN operations using a similar logic diagram.19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 Paul et al., Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies, 17.   
The objectives of the 
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Figure 4: Logic for assessing the case outcomes 
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b. Independent variable groupings 
All the independent variables used in this study are combined into five categories, 
which this thesis calls independent variable groupings. These groupings are branded H1-H5 
and each one relates to one of the five hypotheses. This thesis classifies all the variable 
groupings under specific criteria that to a certain degree will impact on each peacekeeping 
mission’s success or failure.20  
The five independent variable groupings are: 
• H1, the peacekeepers operated in a reliable and secure haven  
• H2, the peacekeepers received enough funding 
• H3, the peacekeepers operated experienced no staff shortages, and were suitably 
trained and coordinated  
• H4, the peacekeepers manged their time effectively and ended the mandate aptly 
• H5, the peacekeepers operated conjointly with non-UN peacekeeping forces 
 
c. Statistical analysis  
The statistical analysis for this study consists of two overarching procedures between 
quantitative and qualitative analysis. Firstly, the quantitative approach focuses on frequency 
analysis and proportion comparison. This procedure is applied to narrow the amount of 
variables and eliminate any factors that show weak result. Secondly, the qualitative approach 
uses the remaining strong values to determine the direct correlation with the desired outcome, 
which is either a peacekeeping success or failure. This is achieved by using a set-theoretic 
method called qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). QCA includes two approaches: the 
crisp and fuzzy set methods. The crisp set method uses binary indicators, and the fuzzy set 
method uses percentage indicators. By applying both methods, this study will increase the 
accuracy of the findings. 
1.4  ORGANISATION OF THESIS  
This thesis is organised into four chapters. The following chapter identifies the case 
outcomes by categorising each operation by either success or failure. The third chapter 
outlines both quantitative and qualitative data analyses processes. It also discussed the key 
                                                          
20 Watkins, 2014. P.12 
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findings of the research project by illustrating the data correlation results and comparing the 
results with the hypotheses offered in Chapter 1. The third chapter will additionally provide 
graphs and tables used to illustrate the difference between the successful and failed 
operations. This process will be implemented by calculating several concepts including the 
number of personnel, budget, and the duration of each mission. The fourth and final chapter 
discusses the larger significance to the peacekeeping field of research. It also suggests 
recommendations for evaluating future peacekeeping mission and what areas of this thesis 
could be analysed with more accuracy. 
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CHAPTER 2: EVALUATING THE CASES 
 
This thesis analyses 56 out of 71 UN peacekeeping mission. The study excludes 15 
on-going missions because they require a different method of analysis, especially they cannot 
be evaluated in the same way in terms of long-term peace commitment. Many of the 56 cases 
could not be assessed easily, as their implementation of mandate was allgedly tainted by the 
low budget, or the UN peacekeepers were depending on the actions of other forces. For 
example, MINURCAT was highly depending on EUFOR forces. While the mixed opinions 
on the outcome of each case are high, this study identifies all the operations as either a 
success or a failure.  
To adjudicate unclear case outcomes, this thesis followed the logic illustrated in 
Figure 3. Firstly, the diagram in Figure 3 asks whether the peacekeeping operation 
implemented its mandate and established order—being some of the main requisites of a 
successful mission noted by Diehl. If the peacekeepers failed to follow up with the mandate 
objectives and providing order in the area of deployment, this study assesses the mission as a 
failure. However, during the Rwandan post-genocide period, MONUC in Congo had severe 
problems implementing its mandate due to the post-genocide situation. Yet, the peacekeepers 
managed to implement their given objectives and protect many Congolese, so the mission is 
defined as a success. The next frame asks whether the operation had a long-term commitment 
towards procuring peace in the region, which is van der Lijn’s seventh criterion. Again, in the 
case of MONUC, the situation was extremely complicated in country, but the mission is 
praised for achieving its aims and mediating tensions between Congo, Rwanda, Uganda, and 
Burundi. Overall, applying the logic from figure 3 to the 56 selected cases resulted in 39 
successes and 17 failures.  
Table 1 in Appendix 1, lists the peacekeeping missions chronologically by their date 
span, and their outcomes. Each entry is arranged by its (1) official name, acronym, and the 
period of time during which the mission operated; (2) the case outcome; (3) and a short 
summary describing what was the mission’s mandate and objectives, highlighting the key 
achievements and shortcomings that contributed to the case’s outcome.  
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2.1  DETAILED OVERVIEW OF THE CASES  
 
1. UN Emergency Force (UNEF I), November 1956-June 1967 
Case outcome: operation success  
The first UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) was established to supervise the withdrawal 
of French, Israeli and the UK forces from the Egyptian territory after the establishment of the 
ceasefire.The mission meant to serve as a buffer zone between the Egyptian and Israeli 
troops, supervise Suez Canal’s cleaning operations, and secure cooperation from the parties 
in implementing the armistice agreement.  
Although most of the operation’s aims were implemented, Diehl noted that this 
operation had its shortcomings.21 This is because war erupted between Israel and Egypt in 
1967, which happened immediately after Egypt requested the UN to withdraw UNEF I from 
its territory. Yet, UNEF I is one of the exceptions that can be deemed a success, as it 
provided precedents for traditional peacekeeping missions and set general benchmarks for 
operations until at least the end of the Cold War. For instance, it introduced the term ‘holy 
trinity’ of traditional peacekeeping: consent, neutrality, and minimum use of force.22 
2. UN Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL), June 1958 December 1958 
Case outcome: operation success  
The UN Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) was established in response to a 
complaint by the Lebanese authorities to the Security Council on 22 May, 1958 amid the 
interference of the United Arab Republic (UAR).23 Slovenian defence expert Maja Garb 
evaluated UNOGIL’s success by three criteria: the fulfilment of the mandate, the political and 
security situation, and assistance to the local population.24  
It is debated whether UNOGIL directly contributed to stabilising the political situation 
and secure order in Lebanon. The operation was initiated during the complex Middle Eastern 
                                                          
21 Diehl, Paul F., and Daniel Druckman. Evaluating peace operations. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010 
p.2 
22 Diehl & Druckman 2010, p.9 
23 Letter Dated 22 May 1958 from the Representative of Lebanon addressed to the President of the 
Security Council, Security Council Document S/2007, 23 May 1958. 
24 Garb, Maja. "Evaluating the success of peace operations." Scientia Militaria: South African Journal 
of Military Studies 42, no. 1 (2014): 44-63. 
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political context exacerbated by Cold War belligerents that added regional and international 
significance. However, UNOGIL’s force reached full strength and achieved its mandate only 
after the situation calmed down and its services were no longer necessary. Yet, the 
operation’s mandate seemed deliberately limited and that was practically all that could be 
provided by the divided Security Council.25 Yet, Mesquita and White claim that “[t]hough 
restricted in its tasks, UNOGIL made the most of its mandate and was able to implement it 
within the realms of its capacity.”26 
3. UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC), July 1960-June 1964 
Case outcome: operation success 
The UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) was created to address the conflict between 
Belgium and its former territory of Congo, which gained independence on 30 June 1960. The 
mission’s objectives included the withdrawal of Belgian troops and ‘foreign military 
personnel,’ including the prevention of a civil war. Given the nature of the changes in the 
situation on the ground as well as at the international level, Jane Boulden argues that the 
achievement of mandate was a significant factor of the operation. Yet, at the peak of divisive 
and highly charged political climate of the Cold War, both inside and outside of the 
operation, “restored law and order in Congo, ensured the country remained a single unit, 
facilitated a restoration of a functioning government, and oversaw the withdrawal of foreign 
troops.”27  
4. UN Security Force in West New Guinea (UNSF), October 1962-April 1963 
Case outcome: operation success 
The UN Security Force in West New Guinea (UNSF) was responsible for providing 
policing enforcement to the UN Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) for the period of 
seven months. The mission was initiated amid the relinquishing of colonial rule by the 
Netherlands and the absorption of the territory by Indonesia. UNSF faced some political and 
                                                          
25 The dispute was addressed first by the League of Arab States. However, internal divisions within 
the organization, which pitched pro-Nasser forces, mainly comprised of Egypt and Syria (forming the 
UAR) and Yemen, against more pro-Western states, such as Lebanon and the Arab Federation of Iraq 
and Jordan, blocked a possible settlement. 
26 Mesquita, Ana Guedes, and Nigel D. White. "UN Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL)." In 
The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations. 2015 p 6-7 
27 Boulden, Jane. "UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC)." In The Oxford Handbook of UN 
Peacekeeping Operations. 2017. P.5 
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operational challenges in carrying out its functions, especially between the local police and 
the Indonesian military. The mandate of the mission did not require its forces to directly 
engage in any serious conflict. Yet, the success of this operation is that it persuaded to 
accelerate the transfer of the power and the progressive replacement of UNSF personnel by 
Indonesian forces in the later stages of the handover.28  
5. UN Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM), July 1963-September 1964 
Case outcome: operation failure 
The UN Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) was given the responsibility to 
oversee the withdrawal agreement of Egyptian and Saudi intervention in the Yemen Civil 
War. Asher Orkaby states that contemporary and historic perceptions of UNYOM have been 
tainted by a “clash of personalities between the mission leader, Carl von Horn, […] and 
Secretary General U Thant.”29 Orkaby adds that UNYOM has been portrayed as a “first 
failure in a new era of ‘tin-cup peacekeeping’ that could scarcely feed and supply UN 
personnel.” The Egyptian troop level continued to grow (40,000 by spring 1964), and there 
seemed no sight of a resolution of the civil war. Surely, the civil war outcome was not the 
UN’s responsibility, but it would have permitted the withdrawal of UNYOM with at least 
some credibility.30 
6. Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic 
(DOMREP), May 1965-October 1966 
Case outcome: operation success  
Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic 
(DOMREP) was comprised of only a small number of observers to oversee the ceasefire amid 
the country’s civil conflict. DOMREP was also tasked to report to the Secretary-General on 
the situation leading up to the elections of the new constitutional government. The mission 
was not the main international actor in the Dominican conflict. Its limited mandate and small 
resources did not allow for great latitude of actions. Yet, the mission’s ability to act 
independently from the OAS and gathering information on the events in the country played 
                                                          
28 MacQueen, Norrie. "UN Security Force in West New Guinea (UNSF)." In The Oxford Handbook of 
UN Peacekeeping Operations. 2015. 
29 Orkaby, Asher. Beyond the Arab Cold War: The International History of the Yemen Civil War, 
1962-68. Oxford University Press, 2017. 
30 UN document S/5927, 2 September 1964: (final) Report of the Secretary-General to the Security 
Council on the Functioning of UNYOM 
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an important role. Bernardo dos Santos argues that DOMREP was able to fully implement its 
mandate contributing to the country’s pacification process and mediating the civil conflict.31  
7. UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM), September 1965-March 1966 
Case outcome: operation success 
The UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM) was set to supervise the 
ceasefire and withdrawal of all armed personnel along the India-Pakistan border other than in 
Jammu and Kashmir. UNIPOM highlighted the importance of following constitutional norms 
in “establishing, supporting, and extending missions.”32 While UNIPOM’s had to supervise a 
ceasefire over a distance of more than a thousand miles, it could not facilitate accurate 
reporting about what was happening in the area. Yet, UNIPOM is a successful mission as it 
completed its mandate with very limited resources deployed in a complex environment in a 
short frame. In addition, the mission’s peacekeepers negotiated an agreement with the two 
sides in mid-December to limit air activity, ultimately contributing to peace in the entire 
area.33  
8. UN Emergency Force (UNEF II), October 1973-July 1979  
Case outcome: operation success  
The second UN Emergency Force (UNEF II) was established in October 1973, 
following its predecessor mission UNEF I. Paul Diehl identifies two criteria that the 
operation succeeded: (1) limit armed conflict, (2) promote conflict resolution. Indeed, UNEF 
II kept peace along the Egyptian-Israeli border and aided the conflict resolution that preceded 
the Camp David Accords.34 In addition, UNEF II reinforced the experience of other UN 
operations, which suggested that “a traditional force could be better effective in interposition 
and monitoring missions.”35 Furthermore, it set new approaches for the future peacekeeping 
missions, securing the outcome of the operation as a clear success.36  
                                                          
31 dos Santos, Bernardo Rodrigues. "Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the 
Dominican Republic (DOMREP)." In The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations. 
32 Singh, P. K. "UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM)." In The Oxford Handbook of UN 
Peacekeeping Operations. 2015 p. 5 
33 Singh, P. K. "UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM)." In The Oxford Handbook of UN 
Peacekeeping Operations. 2015 p. 5 
34 Diehl, Paul F. "International peacekeeping (Perspectives on security)." Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
Univ. Press 3 (1993): 92. CHECK!!! 
35 Diehl, Paul F. "Second UN Emergency Force (UNEF II)." In The Oxford Handbook of UN 
Peacekeeping Operations. 2014. :9 
36 Diehl, 2014: 9 
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9. UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), May 1988-
March 1990 
Case outcome: operation failure 
The UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) was 
established to assist the two countries to ensure the implementation of the Geneva Accords 
and to investigate and report any violations of the Accord. Adam Baczko and Gilles 
Dorronsoro state that the cooperation between the two sides did not go well as Islamabad and 
Kabul were not willing to cooperate with UNGOMAP.37 Instead, they were following their 
own agendas and the UN mission had neither the political support nor the means to 
accomplish the mission. In addition, without the cooperation of the actors involved in the 
conflict, UNGOMAP was limited to registering the complaints from each side without 
investigating them in depth. Hence, it could not take any measures to coerce them to comply 
them with the accords. The mission’s mandate had an explicit part of supervising the 
voluntary return of millions of refugees. Yet, Baczko and Gilles argue that because the 
mission was under-resourced, “UNGOMAP could not collect sufficient information.”38 
Therefore, the operation could only register complaints, but not act upon them.  
10. UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG), August 1988-February 1991 
Case outcome: operation success 
The UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) was deployed to verify and 
monitor the ceasefire between Iran and the mutual withdrawal of their troops. Brigadier 
General Shahedul Anan Khan states that “UNIIMOG was a successful example of an UN 
observer mission that managed to verify, monitor, and maintain a ceasefire between two 
former belligerents.” Although UNIIMOG faced several challenges and limitations in an 
extremely volatile environment, the mission “managed to contribute to the prevention of 
escalation to large-scale violence or a return to major inter-state conflict between Iran and 
Iraq.”39 
11. UN Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I), January 1989-June 1991 
Case outcome: operation success 
                                                          
37 Baczko, Adam, and Gilles Dorronsoro. "UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
(UNGOMAP)." In The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations. 2015 
38 Baczko, 2015 p.6 
39 Khan, Shahedul Anam. "UN Iran–Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)." In The Oxford 
Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations. 2015, p. 7-8 
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The first UN Transition Assistance Group (UNAVEM I) was created to monitor the 
withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angolan territory. The mission is one of the first 
multidimensional UN peace operations that succeeded in carrying out its mandate. 
Particularly, the operation succeeded to verify consensual troop withdrawal, which 
corresponded closely to the category of first-generation peacekeeping operations.40 
Gwinyayi Dzinesa confirms that UNAVEM I “successfully discharged its tasks by 
monitoring the withdrawal of Cuban military personnel and equipment from Angola”41 While 
the end of the overall conflict was far from being resolved, the mission can be regarded as 
successful as it formally ended the interstate conflict in Angola by successfully ridding it of 
its “overt international attributes.”42 Therefore, given its limited capacity, UNAVEM I 
designed a blueprint for the following missions (UNAVEM II, III, MONUA) even though 
their achievements are far being considered a successful exception. 
12. UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), April 1989-March 1990 
Case outcome: operation success 
The UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia was in most respects a 
political operation tasked with creating and managing conditions for a democratic transition 
to independence following a prolonged colonial occupation.43  
On April 1, 1989, when the ceasefire was to come into effect, South African forces 
clashed with the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) combatants, and 
People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) in the northern border areas. Dzienesa claims 
that UNTAG “fulfilled its central objective of ensuring a peaceful, transparent electoral 
process and a smooth transition to independence.”44 Pushkina also states that the overall 
degree of consent and cooperation was high during the mission, and the South Western 
Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) and the Namibian regime (South Africa) complied 
and supported with the UN peacekeepers, which contributed to the mission’s overall 
success.45 
 
                                                          
40 Dzinesa, (2004): 646 
41 Dzinesa (2004): 646 
42 Dzinesa 2004: 646 
43 Dzinesa 648 
44 Dzinesa 649 
45 Pushkina, (2006): 142 
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13. UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), November 1989-January 1992 
Case outcome: operation success 
The UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) was deployed in the five 
countries of Central America: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. 
It was mandated to monitor the implementation of a far-reaching peace agreement 
“Esquipulas II.” The accord intended to lay the foundations for overcoming nearly three 
decades of civil war, violence, and authoritarianism in Central America. ONUCA was the 
first UN’s peacekeeping mission with an explicit disarmament and demobilisation mandate. 
Professor Joachim Koops states that “despite some limitations, the operation was a successful 
example of the UN’s ability to support a regional peace process through confidence-building 
measures, ceasefire monitoring and the more demanding tasks of separation of forces, 
disarmament, and demobilisation.”46 Indeed, ONUCA helped to support the regional process 
in Central America by achieving the implementation of two of its major tasks: verification of 
the peace agreement and monitoring of cross-border rebel and weapons movement. The 
achievement of the two objectives served as confidence-building for the five Central 
American governments.47  
14. UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), April 1991-October 2003 
Case outcome: operation failure 
Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, the UN Security Council 
adopted a resolution for the deployment of the Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) 
and the establishment of the demilitarisation zone (DMZ) between Iraq and Kuwait. 
UNIKOM was tasked to aid other missions operating in Iraq, including the UN Special 
Commission (UNSCOM) and the UN Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission 
(IKBDC). Moreover, UNIKOM was tasked to deter violations of the boundary through its 
presence in the surveillance of the demilitarisation zone. Lastly, it served to observe any 
potentially hostile actions from one State against another. The mission concluded its duties 
                                                          
46 Koops, Joachim A. "UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA)." In The Oxford Handbook 
of UN Peacekeeping Operations. 2014 p. 2 
47 Koops, Joachim A. "UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA)." In The Oxford Handbook of UN 
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after the invasion of Iraq in October 2003, as it became purposeless when the Saddam’s 
regime was forcibly removed.48  
Although the liberation of Kuwait was successful, UNIKOM is labelled as a failure 
due to several reasons. Firstly, in the context of the invasion of Iraq, UNIKOM failed to 
prevent hostilities between the initial belligerents. Secondly, the operation proved incapable 
of reporting the violations of the DMZ by Iraqi’s adversaries, which were likely caused by 
navigation mistakes due to poor training. Thirdly, the cooperation of the parties proved 
dubious, as Polish politician Jan Bury claims, “UNIKOM was significantly financed by one 
side of the conflict, which undermined its credibility and impartiality.”49  
15. UN Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II), June 1991-February 1995 
Case outcome: operation failure 
The second UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II), was tasked to verify the 
implementation of the peace agreement namely the “Bicesse Accords.” The agreement was 
signed between the government of Angola led by the Popular Movement for Liberation of 
Angola (MPLA) and the major opposition movement, the Union for the Total Independence 
of Angola (UNITA). Dzinesa confirms that apart from UNAVEM I, all the subsequent UN 
operations in Angola (UNAVEM II, III, MONUA) failed to implement their mandates and 
secure order in the country.50 Indeed, UNAVEM II kept its impartiality and only monitored 
ceasefire, observed and verified the democratic Angolan presidential and legislative elections 
of 1992. Yet, hopes for peace building in the country vanished as UNITA rejected the results 
of the votes pushing Angola back into civil war.51 The local context hindered UNAVEM II’s 
objectives as both sides of the conflict were uncooperative and violated the Bicesse Accords 
from an early stage. Overall, the lack of compliance with the demobilisation troops obliged 
the UN observers to assume extended monitoring duties, such as counting of troops and 
weapons under extreme conditions.52 
16. UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), July 1991-April 1995 
                                                          
48 Bury, Jan. "UN Iraq–Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM)." In The Oxford Handbook of UN 
Peacekeeping Operations. 2014. P. 1 
49 Bury, 2014. P. 9 
50 Dzinesa, (2004): 644 
51 Guyot, Caroline, and Alex Vines. "UN Angola Verification Missions II and III (UNAVEM II and III)." 
In The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations. 2015: 2 
52 Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Angola Verification Mission II. Security Council document 
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Case outcome: operation success 
The UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) monitored the results of 
negotiations between the El Salvadoran government and the Farabundo Marti National Front 
(FMLN). As Dr. Shannon O’Neil explains, “ONUSAL expanded its initial human rights 
mandate to encompass broad peacebuilding measures, such as the construction of new 
security and juridical institutions, as well as the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-
combatants.”53 Ultimately, the mission’s military division was the definitive factors of its 
success. ONUSAL’s peacekeepers knew that militarisation was the chief problem of El 
Salvador’s conflict, hence their attention was highly devoted to discontinuing both the 
military’s and the FMLN’s armed grip of the country.  
However, while we define the mission as ambitiously successful, there are some of 
the mission’s shortcomings that need to be mentioned. For instance, O’Neil states that the 
UN, following the ONUSAL operation, “should overcome its financial limitations, focusing 
particularly on coordination of international efforts and creation of international standards in 
post-conflict reconstruction and not in the implementation of peace accords.”54 Additionally, 
the initial mandate of the mission expanded numerous times, which undoubtedly led to the 
mission’s success.  
17. UN Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC), October 1991-March 1992 
Case outcome: operation success 
The UN Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) was a short reconnaissance 
operation deployed to prepare the ground for the bigger UN Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia (UNTAC).55. Although the mission operated under ill-defined UN authority, 
UNAMIC could be considered a success. Its difficulties consisted of language barriers 
between its personnel and the Cambodians. Yet, despite these hitches, Benny Widyono 
argues that the mission fulfilled its most important functions and succeeded in several tasks, 
“[i]t also allowed infrastructure to be built in anticipation of the repatriation of refugees 
which was the first objective of UNTAC to be fulfilled.”56 Therefore, following this thesis’s 
                                                          
53 O'Neil, Shannon. "Rethinking the United Nation's Role in Peacekeeping: Lessons from El 
Salvador." JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS-PRINCETON- 10 (1999): 
142-161. 
54 O’Neil 144 
55 Widyono, Benny. "UN Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC)." In The Oxford Handbook of 
UN Peacekeeping Operations. 2014 
56 Widyono, 2014 p.6-7 
Andrej Sagaidak  SVF-3901 
24 
 
logic of assessment, UNAMIC implemented its mandate and provided long-term security to 
the region of deployment.  
18. UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), February 1992-March 1995 
Case outcome: operation failure 
The UN Protection Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNPROFOR) was tasked to 
protect the delivery of humanitarian aid during the Bosnian War. Tardy argues that the fall of 
the town of Srebrenica to the Bosnian Serbs in July 1995 and the massive violations of 
human rights that followed, “made UNPROFOR one the UN peacekeeping failures of the 
early 1990s.”57 Indeed, while UNPROFOR was the biggest operation of the immediate post-
Cold War period, the massacre of more than 8,000 Bosnian mostly Muslim man and boys by 
the Bosnian Serb forces is viewed as an even bigger disaster than UNAMIR in Rwanda. The 
main reason consists in Srebrenica being declared a “safe zone” protected by the Dutch 
force.58 
19. UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), March 1992-September 1993 
Case outcome: operation success 
UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was created to implement key 
provisions of the October 1991 Paris Agreement and facilitate the transition towards peace, 
stability, and democracy in Cambodia after two decades of civil war. This operation could be 
classified as successful, but not without mentioning its shortcomings. For instance, UNTAC 
fulfilled its mandate, but only in part. As Pushkina explains, “it manged a successful 
withdrawal of foreign forces and the implementation of free and fair elections, yet it failed to 
achieve disarmament and demobili[s]ation or maintain law and order.”59 In addition, although 
it preserved violence from spreading beyond national borders, numerous ceasefire violations 
occurred and the number of casualties raised to 100, including 179 wounded in election-
related violence. Yet, Cambodia enjoyed a substantial return of refugees and internally 
displaces persons (IDPs), which were around 365,000. Additionally, UNTAC displayed a 
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high level of flexibility and adaptability and it “provided an important overarching 
institutional support to the country’s stabilisation and political normali[s]ation.”60  
20. UN Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I), April 1992-March 1993 
Case outcome: operation failure 
The first UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) was dispatched to monitor the 
ceasefire that was in effect at the time to protect UN personnel during their humanitarian 
operations working along with US-led multinational task force (UNITAF). UNOSOM I had a 
very limited capacity due to Somalia’s central government collapse, therefore, the UN had to 
seek wider consent to deploy its military troops. Given the absence of an effective political 
agreement, and the persistence of fighting in Magadishu it is indeed difficult to highlight any 
major achievements of UNOSOM I. Williams argues that the mission’s failure lies within its 
strategic and operational limitations. But most importantly, the scholar notes that 
“[UNOSOM I] failed to deploy on time and in full.” 61 Because of this, in the Comprehensive 
Report for Lessons Learned from UN in Somalia, the text states that “to gather, analyse and 
feed information to the responsible security, political or humanitarian officials […] was non-
existent in UNOSOM I.”62 Therefore, the mission failed to implement its basic mandate and 
establish order in the region.  
21. UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), December 1992-December 1994 
Case outcome: operation success 
The UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) was established to secure a lasting 
peace in Mozambique following the civil war between the government and the Mozambican 
National Resistance (RENAMO). Pushkina states that during this operation, all major 
violence ceased, demobilisation was partially implemented, and “the overall security situation 
prior to the elections was improved.”63 In addition, a detailed investigation by UN 
peacekeepers on human rights abuses further contributed to stabilisation of the situation, 
which in turn created a stable environment for the return and resettlement of refugees. After 
the operation was terminated in late 1994, “large-scale violence did not recur and 
Mozambique began the process of peacebuilding and reconstruction, yielding impressive 
                                                          
60 Widyono, Benny. "UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)." In The Oxford Handbook of 
UN Peacekeeping Operations. 2015: 11 
61 Williams, Paul D. "UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)." In The Oxford Handbook of UN 
Peacekeeping Operations. 2015: 7 
62 The Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned from UN Operation in Somalia, para. 17. 
63 Pushkina, (2006): 135 
 
Andrej Sagaidak  SVF-3901 
26 
 
results in just a few years.”64 According to the logic in figure 3 and the four criteria that 
Pushkina developed, UNOMOZ secures a strong indicator of a successful operation.  
22. UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), March 1993-March 1995 
Case outcome: operation failure 
The second UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) was a following mission after 
UNOSOM I and UNITAF. UNOSOM II was tasked to rehabilitate Somalia’s political 
institutions and economy and promote political settlement and national reconciliation 
between the principal factions in the civil war. The mission had to cover the whole territory 
of Somalia, which eventually occurred, but not as smooth as planned, for several reasons. 
Firstly, while UNITAF’s strength was approximately 37,000 troops to cover 40 percent of 
Somalia’s territory, UNOSOM II was granted only 28,000 military and police troops to cover 
the entire country. Consequently, some parts of the country were left without a UN 
presence.65 Additionally, Pushkina says that there was a delay in the provision of finance, and 
after attacks on the UN peacekeepers in June 1993, “the level of commitment further 
declined.” She adds that “major delays in the supply of resources continued, followed by the 
final withdrawal of the resources by the United States and Western European countries.”66 
Therefore, the lack of sustained UN commitment to the resolution of the Somalia conflict 
contributed directly to the overall failure of the mission, despite the US providing initial 
political and military support.67  
23. UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR), June 1993-September 1994 
Case outcome: operation failure 
Given the magnitude of the tensions between the countries, the UN Observer Mission 
Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) had only 81 military observers and had limited equipment and 
air surveillance. UNOMUR’s mandate focused primarily on transit or transport, by road or 
tracks of lethal weapons and ammunition across the border between Uganda and Rwanda. As 
UNOMUR’s commander Romeo A. Dallaire noted, “given my tiny force of eighty-one 
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observers and the fact that we had no helicopters with night-vision capability, the task of 
keeping the border under surveillance was at best symbolic.”68  
Similarly, Linda Mevern states that “[t]he Security Council, hoping to save money, 
decided that UNOMUR would focus its efforts on main roads.”69 Yet, while UNOMUR 
cannot be evaluated individually regarding UN’s disastrous effort in Rwanda, it still failed to 
implement its mandate and establish order at the border between the countries.  
24. UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), August 1993-June 2009 
Case outcome: operation failure 
The UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) was deployed to verify compliance 
with the ceasefire agreement between Georgia and Abkhazia. During its sixteen years of 
deployment, UNOMIG had to deal with the consequences of the protracted Russian-Georgian 
skirmish.  
Professor Bruno Coppieters argues that “UNOMIG did not have the means necessary 
to halt the unfolding spiral of conflict escalation affecting the triangular dispute between 
Russia, Georgia, and Abkhazia.” The scholar adds that “[i]ts mandate was not overambitious 
for an observer mission, and it did manage to achieve a significant number of its 
objectives.”70 Indeed, UNOMIG was totally dependent on Russia as both the facilitator and a 
peacekeeper. As the five-day Russo-Georgian War broke out, the mission’s withdrawal 
proved premature and its overall ineffectiveness against Russia’s supremacy in the diplomatic 
and military fields against Georgia deems the mission as a failure. 
25. UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), September 1993-September 1997 
Case outcome: operation success 
During the continuing unrest and fighting, the Economic Community of West Africa 
(ECOWAS) deployed its Ceasefire Monitoring and Observation Group (ECOMOG), 
originally to act as a military monitoring group. Subsequently, The UN Observer Mission in 
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Liberia (UNOMIL) was also installed to assist ECOMOG in monitoring, verifying, and 
reporting violations of the 1993 Cotonou peace agreement.71 
While the UN Secretary-General referred to the “successful conclusion” of UNOMIL, 
it is difficult to evaluate what failure looked like beside the official evaluation.72 Yet, despite 
its limitations and problems—for example, its late deployment and small resource—the 
mission succeeded. Particularly, it succeeded in bringing together the fractions and eventually 
persuading the belligerents of the Liberian civil war to agree to elections and thus paving way 
for brief respite. Furthermore, one of the main factors that defines the mission as a success 
was the mediation of power struggles and disputes, which allowed the July 1997 elections 
with no significant violence.73 
26. UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), September 1993-June 1996 
Case outcome: operation success 
The UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) was created to assist and monitor the police and 
to modernise the armed forces of Haiti. UNMIH’s contribution to peace in Haiti could be 
seen from three factors. Firstly, UNMIH provided guidance and training to the Haitian police 
and monitored its operations, and it created the Criminal Investigation Unit to investigate 
human rights violations in place since the 1991 coup. Secondly, although the overall national 
infrastructure remained insufficient in Haiti, UNMIH progressed small projects aimed at 
repairing water, sanitation, and electricity facilities, including roads. Thirdly, the mission’s 
key role in providing financial, technical, and logistical support to the 1995 elections, created 
free and fair polls. Ultimately, UNMIH brought its practices to the subsequent UN missions 
by generally implementing its mandate and establishing order in Haiti.74 
27. UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), October 1993-March 1996 
Case outcome: operation failure 
The UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was created to assist the security 
of Kigali, monitor ceasefire agreement, establishing a demilitarised zone, and monitor the 
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security leading to elections. The failure to prevent, and ultimately to stop the genocide, 
labels the overall UN presence in Rwanda as a disastrous failure.  
Indeed, while UNAMIR kept to its scrawny mandate’s limitations, it led to 700,000 
Tutsis and moderate Hutus being slain by the hands of genocidal extremists that took control 
of governmental institutions. Therefore, the operation may have kept to its limited mandate, 
but it failed to establish order catastrophically.75  
28. UN Aouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG), May 1994-June 1994 
Case outcome: operation success 
The UN Aouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG) is the shortest, smallest and most 
inexpensive peacekeeping operation in the history of the UN. Lasting a little longer than a 
month, UNASOG had nine military observers and six international civilian staff. They were 
tasked with monitoring the withdrawal of Libyan armed forces from the previously disputed 
territory of the Aouzou strip between southern Libya and Chad. Joachin Koops and Hubertus 
Jürgenliemk argue that despite the modest nature of the operation, “[i]t represents a 
successful instance of confidence-building and verification that helped to implement a ruling 
of the international Court of Justice (ICJ).”76 The scholars add that UNASOG also marked a 
successful end of a border dispute that had been the cause of violent tensions, frequent 
skirmishes between the two states for more than a decade.  
29. UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT), December 1994-May 2000 
Case outcome: operation success 
After a short but devastating civil war in Tajikistan, the UN Mission of Observers in 
Tajikistan (UNMOT) was deployed to fulfil diplomatic and administrative functions by 
assisting the Joint Commission in monitoring and implementing the Tehran Agreement. The 
mission was also in charge of investigating any ceasefire violations, facilitating humanitarian 
assistance, and liaising closely with the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Peacekeeping force.77 Joachin 
Koops evaluates UNMOT as “one of the lesser known though relatively successful post-Cold 
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War peacekeeping operations to be deployed in the immediate aftermath of civil war.”78 
Indeed, the mission marked one of the few successes after the fall of the Soviet Union. 
30. UN Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III), February 1995-June 1997 
Case outcome: operation failure 
On February 8, 1995, UNAVEM II was replaced by UNAVEM III to assist the 
government and UNITA in restoring peace and achieving national reconciliation against a 
“fragile politico-military background.”79 UNAVEM III had a larger number of troops and 
resources than its predecessor mission. Furthermore, while its main objective was to “assist 
the parties in national reconciliation by monitoring the ceasefire and the implementation of 
the Lusaka Protocol,” UNAVEM III failed to fulfil its mandate because of ongoing ceasefire 
violations observed as early as October 1995.80 
31. UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO), May 1995-January 
1996 
Case outcome: operation failure 
In 1995, the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Croatia was transformed into the 
UN Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO), which became a component of the UN 
Peace Forces. Despite its smaller size, UNCRO kept its mandate by ensuring the supervision 
of the March 1994 Ceasefire Agreement, facilitating the implementation of the December 
1994 Economic Agreement, and implementing other elements of the existing UN plans. Yet, 
the relapse into conflict in May and then in August 1995, proved the ineffectiveness of the 
mission to contain the Croatian offensive against Western Slavonia and the Krajina. 
Particularly, Tardy argues that UNCRO’s failure was in its passivity “illustrated by its lack of 
response to the Croatian military operations of May and August 1995.”81 Therefore, while 
this operation initially implemented its mandate, the subsequent resumption of conflict 
indicates that the mission is a failure. 
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32. UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP), March 1995-February 1999 
Case outcome: operation success 
The UN Security Council Resolution 983 split UNPROFOR into three separate 
operations: UNPROFOR in Macedonia became the UN Preventive Deployemnt Mission in 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (UNPREDEP). Its mandate remained largely 
unchanged, only added additional tasks of monitoring and reporting on illicit arms flows and 
other prohibited activities. Although the UN was not chosen to monitor the 2001 Ohrid 
Agreement that ultimately ended the conflict in Macedonia, the overall success of 
UNPREDEP could be assessed by two of its achievements. Firstly, despite the talks that the 
mission needed a more robust force, UNPREDEP was able to operate without harassment and 
work constructively with their counterparts. Secondly, the absence of fighting facilitated the 
mission’s mandate implementation and it preserved its freedom of movement and 
impartiality. 82 Surely, if the operation was deployed in the same degree of violent 
environment as the Bosnian operation did, the outcome could have been much different. Yet, 
its ultimate role proved to be successful in Macedonia.  
33. UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), December 1995-December 2002 
Case outcome: operation success 
The UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) was established as part of 
the post-war peacebuilding mechanisms. This was the first time the UN deployed a mission 
primarily composed of a police force. The conflict started in Bosnia in April 1992 and ended 
in October 1995 after the offensive of both Bosnian and Croatian forces against the Serbs 
over the summer of 1995. Surely without NATO’s airstrikes on the Serb positions in August 
and September 1995 (Operation Deliberate Force) the conflict would have had a different 
outcome.83 A ceasefire was agreed after the formal signature of the Dayton Agreement by 
Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, Croatian President Franjo Tudman, and Serbian 
President Slobodan Milocevic. Therefore, UNMIBH played a crucial role in establishing 
peace in the region and securing its status as a successful mission in this thesis. 
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34. UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western 
Sirmium (UNTAES), January 1996-January 1998 
Case outcome: operation success 
The UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western 
Sirmium (UNTAES) was established along the UN Police Support Group (UNPSG) to 
monitor the conflict in Eastern Slavonia. The missions were examples of high-level 
commitment that yielded great future ideas for the UN peacekeeping. During the two-year 
period, the UN staff demonstrated a high level of commitment to the mission from the very 
beginning, supplying most of the necessary finance, troops and logistical resources in a 
timely fashion. Specifically, the mission received all 5,000 troops appointed, and 561 of the 
700 uniformed observers and policemen. Pushkina argues that “[t]his level of commitment 
did not diminish through the duration of the deployment, and it is likely that this was a 
primary reason for the mission’s success.”84  
35. UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP), January 1996-December 2002 
Case outcome: operation success 
The UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP) was the smallest of the UN 
peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s. Its maximum capacity 
had 28 military personnel. While its dimensions were extremely limited, UNMOP took and 
completed important roles. The mission monitored the short border between Croatia and 
Montenegro, particularly on the Adriatic side by the contested Prevlaka peninsula. This area 
was infamous for being a flashpoint in any new regional war. Ultimately, UNMOP was a 
successful mission despite its rather peripheral role to history. Particularly, it played a 
substantial role in defusing the potential escalations around the border. The fact that both 
Prevlaka and Bay of Kotor are now largely overlooked by scholars who study the history of 
the Balkans, is a good indicator of how UNMOP kept the tensions in check. 85 
Case outcome: operation success 
36. UN Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH), July 1996-July 1997 
Case outcome: operation success 
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Following the termination of the previous mission, UNMIH, which main 
achievements included bringing fair elections and a peaceful transfer of power, the country 
experienced a tangible insecurity from a weak economy and high levels of social inequality. 
The creation of the UN Security Council authorised the Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH), 
culminating the UN Security Council to reduce its continued presence in Haiti. Therefore, it 
granted the mission only 300 civilian police and 600 troops.  
Despite the shortcomings of the mission, UNSMIH can be evaluated as success as it 
contributed to Haiti’s minimum level of security. Particularly, it was visible when the Haitian 
National Police (HNP) was assisted by the UNSMIH’s helicopters to dangerous locations 
around the country.86  
37. UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA), January 1997-May 1997 
Case outcome: operation success  
The UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) took on several forms 
during its deployment, tasked with a broad and complex peacekeeping function in the 
Guatemalan peace processes. The thirty-six-year-long internal armed conflict in Guatemala 
was formally settled through negotiations in which the UN played a key role. During this 
time, MINUGUA took on the role as a human rights observer mission from November 1994 
to December 1996. Subsequently, it became a peacekeeping interlude in Spring 1997 
separating the belligerents and demobilising the rebels.87  
 Yet, Amy Ross argues that while MINUGUA facilitated the formal end of the 
conflict in Guatemala, “it fell too weak to force the successive government to implement the 
reforms necessary to reali[s]e all the terms of the peace accords.”88 Therefore, MINUGUA 
provides a good example of why peacekeeping missions should not be judged primarily on 
mandate implementation. The main reason for such is that its mandate was changed multiple 
times. However, while the mission failed to achieve all its tasks, it should be labelled as a 
success. One apparent reason is that MINUGUA strengthened Guatemala’s institutions and 
                                                          
86 Siman, Maira, and Vahan Galoumian. "UN Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH)." In The Oxford 
Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations. 2015: 6 
87 Ross, Amy. "UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA)." In The Oxford Handbook of 
UN Peacekeeping Operations. 2015. P. 1 
88 Ross, 2015. P. 7 
 
Andrej Sagaidak  SVF-3901 
34 
 
local actors, which was evident in the prosecution of the former head of state for the crime of 
genocide.89 
38. UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA), June 1997-February 1999 
Case outcome: operation failure 
In June 1997, UNAVEM III was replaced with a smaller and cheaper UN Observer 
Mission for Angola (MONUA). MONUA’s aim was to focus on diplomatic mediation rather 
than persist on military intervention. This time, it was the UN’s excessive optimism chiefly 
influenced by financial considerations that led to the MONUA’s failure. The initial decision 
to establish MONUA was also resonated with the UN’s adopted policy of downsizing its 
presence in African countries, partly as a “result of the difficulties it had encountered in 
Somalia and Rwanda.”90 
As, Dzinesa argues, “the general strained nature of Angola’s politico-military 
relations negated the prospects of an effective demobilisation and reintegration exercise.”91 
Simply said, the following deterioration of the military situation between the Angolan parties 
reduced MONUA to an ineffectual presence. Although MONUA completed some minor 
tasks like confirming the free movement of people and commodities, it still falls short to 
demonstrate its achievements.  
39. UN Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH), August 1997-December 1997 
Case outcome: operation success 
The official termination of UNSMIH was followed by the August 1997 creation of the 
UN Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH) to support and contribute to the 
professionalisation of the Haitian police and also promoting the concept of community 
policing. Blanca Antonini states that “[a]s the country faced urgent challenges stemming 
from political confrontation, institutional paralysis, and social unrest, UNTMIH’s presence 
with a residual military element and the promise to follow-on UN mission had a moderating 
influence that helped to preserve some stability.”92 Indeed, the mission helped minimise the 
impact of a change that entailed an apparent decline of the UN presence and a diminished 
political profile. Yet, Antonini adds that “[w]hile UNTMIH complied with the short-term 
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effects of its mandate, it was constrained by the severe limitations resulting from political and 
financial restrictions placed on peace operations.”93 Yet, the main achievement of UNTMIH, 
was that it reinforced the Haitian police, which contributed to the country’s order despite the 
country’s remaining economic struggles. 
40. UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH), December 1997-March 2000 
Case outcome: operation failure 
The UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) was launched as the fourth 
mission in Haiti and its mandate entailed technical assistance and training to the HNP. Unlike 
the first three missions MIPONUH had no military component, relying exclusively on 
international civil police. During its twenty-seven months duration, the mission was unable to 
contain the violence or exercise a moderating influence on political leaders since its functions 
had no executive power and only limited strength and visibility. Antonini argues that “a 
stronger leverage could have enabled MIPONUH to be more convincing in breaking the logic 
of polari[s]ation and introducing a dynamic of change.”94 Yet, Antonini adds that 
“MIPONUH’s main weakness lay in the absence of a sense of ownership of the HNP among 
political leadership and the majority of Haitians.” Overall, MIPONUH failed to pass the logic 
from figure 3 by falling short of establishing order through its mandate, but also confirming 
its stabilisation efforts’ futility as the 2004 crisis emerged in Haiti.  
41. UN Civilian Police Support Group (UNCPSG), January 1998-October 1998 
Case outcome: operation success 
The UN Civilian Police Support Group (UNCPSG) took over policing tasks after 
UNTAES terminated its duties in January 1998 to continue monitoring the performance of 
the Croatian police in the Danube region. Particularly, the mission was tasked to assist the 
return of displaced persons for a single nine-month period. The UN Secretary-General 
evaluated the overall performance of the mission as satisfactory, although acknowledging a 
continuing and worrying trend of ethnically motivated incidents. Indeed, UNCPSG prevented 
the return of instability in the region, and it also proved to be a cost-effective instrument in 
helping to maintain conditions that were ultimately handed over to the police monitoring 
programme of OSCE.95 
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42. UN Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA), April 1998-February 
2000 
Case outcome: operation success  
UN Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) was deployed in response 
to the crisis that started in 1996. The operation marked a turning point in the UN’s 
engagement with Africa after it became reluctant to intervene amid its failures in Somalia and 
Rwanda. MINURCA played a key role for the Central African Republic (CAR) to hold the 
elections after a period of relatively no incidents. Most importantly, MINURCA allowed the 
UN Security Council to regain confidence for crisis management in the continent. The 
mission also reinforced several trends in the field of peace operations. For example, it 
reflected the growth of collaboration between the UN and regional actors.96 Surely, while the 
operation had its limitations, like the lack of resources and equipment to ensure the country’s 
security, MINURCA was a moderately successful role in the UN’s gradual re-engagement in 
Africa.  
43. UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), July 1998-October 1999 
Case outcome: operation success 
The UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) was a small observer mission 
that worked alongside a much larger enforcement operation deployed by the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Since its start, UNOMSIL knew that its size 
could not cope with the magnitude of the war in the country. Therefore, the mission’s prime 
role was to show UN’s presence and bolster the legitimacy of the ECOWAS operation. 
UNOMSIL success could be defined for its singular act of appending an addendum to the 
Lome Peace Agreement, which prevented the blanket amnesty granted to the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF) from being applied universally. In the end, this act allowed the creation 
of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the deployment of UNAMSIL.97 Therefore, given 
its minimal size, UNOMSIL was successful in implementing its given tasks and allowing the 
succeeding to operate in a safe environment. 
44. UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), October 1999-December 2005 
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Case outcome: operation success 
The UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was officially authorised to implement 
the July 1999 Lome Peace agreement and assist the government of Sierra Leone in the 
implementation of the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration process. The mission 
also focused on the delivery of the humanitarian assistance previously set by UNOMSIL. The 
operation faced tremendous problems when the RUF continued to fight the Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the Civil Defence Forces in the countryside. This 
prevented UNAMSIL to access the diamond-rich areas in May 2000. This incident brought 
several of its peacekeepers killed, holding around 500 hostages, and seizing their heavy 
weapons and vehicles.  
Professor Funmi Olonosakin argues that the May 2000 tragedy was the “necessary 
evil” that spurred the UN to reinvent itself and this is arguably the most important factor that 
led to UNAMSIL’s success. 98 Particularly, amid the crisis the UN increased its troop strength 
by 17,000, and took several steps to improve international coordination to signal support and 
reorganisation of UNAMSIL by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Overall, the 
mission is a success as its recovery from the year 2000 ordeal offers a wealth of lessons for 
current and future peacekeeping operations.99  
45. UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), October 1999-May 2002 
Case outcome: operation success 
The UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was established as a 
temporary governing authority for East Timor with three main components: covering 
governance, humanitarian assistance, and security. Norrie MacQueen stresses that “[b]eyond 
sporadic—and lessoning—difficulties on the Indonesian border […] UNTAET continued to 
pursue its mandate in a more or less stable internal environment.”100 This was evident as 
peaceful elections for an eighty-eight-seat constituent assembly were held in August 2001.  
Yet, UNTAET was faced with a socio-political dilemma of how to bring the territory 
to independence as quickly but also as effectively. Indeed, speed and effectiveness are not 
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always going along in harmony. To have properly developed local capacity, MacQueen 
explains that “UNTAET would almost certainly have delayed independence beyond 2002—
and in so doing may well have provoked the resentment of those for whom capacity was 
being built.”101 Overall, this operation can still be considered successful, but not without 
remembering its shortcomings due to its rapid pace of implementing its tasks.  
46. UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), 
November 1999-June 2010 
Case outcome: operation success 
The UN Organisation Mission in the DRC (MONUC) was formed following the 1994 
Rwandan genocide. In the aftermath of the massacre, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) 
defeated the Hutu-dominated Rwanda armed forces (FAR) and the Hutu extremist militia 
(Interahamwe). The aftermath embroiled four countries: the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, and 
Burundi. In an effort to create some confidence and lower the tensions that periodically 
involved fighting, MONUC established and facilitated an indispensable reconciliation 
between the countries. After more than ten years of its existence and a record of financing for 
a single UN operation, MONUC helped to secure the implementation of both the 1999 
Lusaka and 2002 Pretoria Agreements. The accords helped overt foreign intervention in the 
DRC, reunified the country, and created a new constitutional order, which eventually led to 
generally accepted national elections. One significant shortcoming of MONUC was that it 
wasunable to end the systemic violence against the civilians in the eastern Congo. This 
created an impression of ineffectiveness despite the protection to countless vulnerable 
Congolese. 102 Yet, while MONUC struggled to implement all its tasks, it is an overall 
exceptional success considering that it had to operate in a highly complex post-genocide 
environment. 
47. UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), July 2000-July 2008 
Case outcome: operation failed 
The UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) was deployed after various 
international actors sought to stop the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea.  
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Andreas Sugar and Patrick Cammaert argue that “[t]he peace process between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea seemingly had all the ingredients for success and yet ended in failure.”103 
Perhaps, the operation’s failure could be attributed to the country’s themselves. For instance, 
by the end of 2006, UNMEE’s utility was merely operating as the mission was unable to 
fulfil its original mandate or even play a deterrent role to ensure the separation of forces or 
the integrity of the TSZ. The failure of implementing its mandate was due to the lack of 
cooperation, especially from the side of Eritrea.104  
48. UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), May 2002-May 2005 
Case outcome: operation failed 
The UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) was a peacekeeping operation 
as a successor to the UN transitional administration in the territory. The mission’s mandate 
included the provision of direct military and civilian support to help promoting national 
capacity building during East Timor’s early period as an independent state.  
On the positive side, MacQueen argues that “[g]iven the constrains of resources and 
timescale within which it was required to operate, UNMISET produced some significant 
results.”105 On the other hand, UNMISET’s shortcomings overwhelm its achievements, 
which could be addressed to the elements of its malfunctional mandate. MacQueen adds that 
the failures could be derived “not from inherent faults within its own organi[s]ation but from 
the larger setting in which it was established and required to operate.”106 This was proved 
after the mission’s premature withdrawal in May 2005. The tensions contained and managed 
by the UN exploded just a year after its peacekeepers left. Therefore, this proves that if the 
mandate of an operations is defective, the peacekeepers’ efforts would be futile.  
49. UN Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI), May 2003-April 2004 
Case outcome: operation success 
The creation of the UN Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI) was established as a 
small political mission to facilitate the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement by Ivorian parties. Its 
mandate included the provision of advice to the Special Representative on military matters, 
                                                          
103 Cammaert, 2015. P.11 
104 Cammaert, 2015. P.12 
105 MacQueen, Norrie. "UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET)." In The Oxford 
Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations. 2015 (II), p. 9 
106 MacQueen, 2015 (II), p. 9 
 
Andrej Sagaidak  SVF-3901 
40 
 
monitoring the military situation, and providing input to forward planning on the DDR 
program. Given the small amount of personnel, MINUCI achieved its goals. Particularly, it 
established liaison with the French and ECOWAS. Subsequently, following an attempted 
coup in April 2004, MINUCI was replaced by the full-fledged multidimensional 
peacekeeping operation—the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI).107 
50. UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), April 2004-June 2017 
Case outcome: operation success 
The UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), was deployed amid a failed coup 
attempt of the president Laurent Gbagbo by the soldiers of the Ivorian armed forces. The 
mission’s focus was to lead the country towards the presidential elections that was one key 
point of contention in the overall peace process. The implementation of UNOCI’s mandate 
was repeatedly constrained by the weak consent of the country, the French policies, and the 
mixed feelings of the UN Secretariat on the mere existence of the mission. Yet, the mission 
managed to lead the country towards the presidential elections.108  
Indeed, although very few of the components of peace are in place in Côte d’Ivoire, 
the 2015 elections became less interesting after the country experienced the second economic 
miracle of consecutive nine percent annual growth.  
51. UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), June 2004-October 2017 
Case outcome: operation success 
The UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was established in April 2004 
to replace the Multinational Interim Force (MIF) that had been deployed to stabilise the 
country earlier in February 2004. Following MINUSTAH’s deployment, Haiti president 
Aristide was once again ousted amid political turmoil and violence.109 MINUSTAH’s 
mandate included support for security sector reform, promotion and protection of human 
rights, and the assistance in organising and monitoring the following elections. 
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While the operation has undoubtedly contributed to the ‘stabilisation of Haiti, a string 
of sexual assaults scandals afflicted the military components of MINUSTAH and fuelled an 
anti-UN sentiment in the country. Yet, as Lemay-Hebert argues, “[h]ad it not been for the UN 
presence, the transitional government would probably have been engulfed in the 2004-06 
surge of violence.”110 Overall, MINUSTAH’s implementation of mandate and a mere 
establishment or order in the country could label the mission as a success.  
52. UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB), June 2004-December 2006 
Case outcome: operation success 
The UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB) was established to monitor and support the 
implementation of the Arusha Agreement between the warring Hutu and Tutsi tribes. Arthur 
Boutellis claims that “ONUB has generally been presented as a UN success story.”111 Indeed, 
its relatively rapid and effective deployment, including a realistic mandate, allowed the 
peacekeepers to secure ceasefire agreements with remaining rebel groups. Furthermore, these 
efforts led to their disarmament and demobilisation process.  
Ultimately, the first post-transitional democratic elections in Burundi solidified the 
mission’s success. The UN Secretary-General claimed that “without extensive political, 
military, technical and logistical support from ONUB, the referendum and five subsequent 
elections could not have been successfully conducted between February and September 
2005.” 112 Although the loss of leverage and the request of the ONUB to withdraw by the host 
government, the mission’s reputation should not be tainted by it. Instead, the request for its 
withdrawal should be seen as a broader tendency of host government “to assert their 
sovereignty by refusing the prolonged presence of peacekeepers as an obstacle to 
‘normali[s]ation’.”113  
53. UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), March 2005-July 2011 
Case outcome: operation success 
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The UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was created to support the implementation of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed by the government of Sudan including its 
armed forces (SAF), and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Wibke 
Hansen evaluates the UN mission by stating that “success in mandate implementation was 
contingent, inter alia, on two factors: the will of the parties to advance the CPA and their 
acceptance of UNMIS’s supporting role.”114 Indeed, the mission was most successful when 
both parties welcomed its involvement..  
The most severe shortcoming of the mission was regarding its tasks for protection of 
civilians (PoC).115 Specifically, when fighting erupted between SAF and SPLA in Abyei in 
May 2008, UNMIS was criticised for “not having done enough to protect civilians.”116 Yet, 
while UNMIS’s environment proved to be very challenging, the mission managed to 
implement an extremely overambitious portfolio, which stretched well beyond immediate 
CPA issues.117 
54. UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), August 2006-December 2012 
Case outcome: operation success 
The UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) was deployed in August 2006 
in the aftermath of widespread civil disorder. The previous peacekeeping mission in Timor 
(UNMISET) was different in terms that it was created to support the country’s “resumed” 
national independence in May 2002.118 UNMIT included operational police component and a 
group of military liaison officers as a range of civilian specialists. The seventy-six months 
operation was tasked to support the 2007 presidential and parliamentary elections, support the 
government to consolidate stability and enhance democratic governance. Additionally, it 
helped strengthening the national capacity for monitoring and promoting human rights. 
Overall, the success of the operation could be attributed to the 2012 national elections 
that gave way to the future of the parliamentary system. Specifically, five years after the 2007 
appointment of José Ramos-Horta, he was replaced in “efficiently organi[s]ed and carried 
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through elections”119 by former military leader Taur Matan Ruak. The new head of state was 
well known to UN officials and his succession took place in an entirely calm atmosphere.120 
55. UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), September 
2007-December 2010 
Case outcome: operation failure 
The UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) was 
deployed to address some of the spill-over effects of the war in Darfur, Sudan. MINURCAT 
was enforced by a smaller European Force (EUFOR), which helped to carry out its mandate 
to protect civilians in danger, refugees and displaced persons, including the facilitation for 
delivering humanitarian aid to Chad.121   
MINURCAT could be considered as the UN’s first ‘pure’ civilian protection 
operation. As John Karlsrud argues, this was facilitated by the government’s position that the 
mission should not have a political mandate.122 This meant that MINURCAT had a limited 
amount troops and it highly depended on EUFOR. Considering that the European Union can 
deploy much faster than the UN, the subsequent cooperation between the two organisations 
did not go well. Specifically, their operational coordination was malfunctioning. For 
example, while the EUFOR was equipped with armoured personnel carriers and other heavy 
vehicles, its commanders failed to recognise that the real threat to civilians was armed 
banditry and other low-level threats in eastern Chad.123 Therefore, MINURCAT can hardly 
be considered as a successful mission, as it was failing to implement some of its initial tasks 
due to the lack of establishing an effective liaison with EUFOR. 
56. UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS), April 2012-August 2012 
Case outcome: operation failure 
The UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) was tasked to monitor a cessation of 
armed violence and support the implementation of Kofi Annan’s six-point plan for Syria.124 
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Richard Gowan states that “UNSMIS was a small, short-lived and unsuccessful attempt to 
end a rapidly escalating civil war that would go on to claim hundreds of thousands of lives 
and drive millions from their homes.”125 Indeed, the mission was a clear failure if judged by 
the basic criterion of whether or not it helped ending the Syrian war. Although UNSMIS 
prioritised the promotion of lower-level political contacts between the belligerents, it failed in 
implementing these efficiently for affecting the war.  
On one side, the mission was unable to “systematically monitor and report” either the 
journalists’ freedom of movement or peaceful protests. On the other, the UN officials 
observing protests came under attack.126 Overall, had the operation been in place for longer, it 
would still have a similar outcome. As UN National Security Advisor Susan Rise stressed, “a 
mission of 300 unarmed observers could not play an important role in deterring or preventing 
violence.”127 
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CHAPTER 3: APPROACH TO DATA ANALYSIS 
 
3.1  DYNAMICS OF PEACEKEEPING 
To fit the scope of the project into the size of a master’s thesis, it was determined that 
the list of peacekeeping factors would need to be within realistic boundaries. The method for 
deducting only the most appropriate number of independent factors is a three-step process. 
Firstly, the political situation, the social system, or the environmental factors of the conflicted 
region were rejected. This thesis only focuses on features related to the dynamics of the 
peacekeeping operations. Simply said, step one reveals 13 factors that were derived from 
previous studies that analysed UN peacekeeping operations. Therefore, these essential factors 
seem appropriate to the scope of this thesis that covers 56 peacekeeping missions for 
fundamental accuracy. The next step merges similar factors and eliminates any factor that 
does not relate—at a certain extend—to one of the five hypotheses illustrating only 13 
peacekeeping factors. These factors act as independent variables for each of the qualitative 
and quantitative methods. The process reveals how these independent variables are used in 
the final qualitative comparative analyses process. Table 5 lists the 13 peacekeeping factors, 
their number, and the independent variable grouping for each. The factors are abbreviated as 
f1-f13. Each narrative is assigned to a specific hypothesis, for example, f5 is allocated within 
the variable grouping of H2.  
Table 5 List of peacekeeping factors used for each hypothesis  
VARIABLE 
GROUPING 
FACTOR 
NUMBER 
CONCEPT 
H1 f1 The environment was secured and safe for the peacekeepers  
H1 f2 The UN peacekeepers were targeted by the conflicting parties  
H1 f3 The UN peacekeepers experienced casualties  
H2 f4 The mission received appropriate equipment and technology  
H2 f5 Each peacekeeper was sufficiently funded 
H3 f6 The mission received enough personnel to implement its aims 
H3 f7 The personnel were appropriately trained and coordinated  
H4 f8 The mission was deployed in a timely and effective manner  
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H4 f9 The mission held an appropriate mandate and amended it when the 
situation changed in the region 
H4 f10 The peacekeepers were forced to withdraw by the request of the 
local government  
H5 f11 The mission operated in cooperation with non-UN external 
organisations (e.g. NATO, OSCE, AU, etc.) 
H5 f12 Non-UN professional military engaged in fighting to protect the UN 
peacekeepers 
H5 f13 Non-UN external support acted independently from the UN and 
engaged in fighting without UNSC’s consent  
  
3.2.  QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
3.2.1  Frequency  
A study was conducted by Watkins examined the dynamics of modern 
insurgencies.128 This study follows Watkins’s structure by illustrating the frequency of each 
factor, creating a quad-chart for the five independent variable groupings. Each independent 
variable grouping is related to a hypothesis, which holds either two or three factors in its 
section. For instance, H1 corresponds with hypothesis 1 “The peacekeepers require a safe 
haven from which to operate.” and includes factors f1-f3. The X-axis divides cases of 
peacekeeping success from cases of peacekeeping failure. The Y-axis divides the 
peacekeeping cases where the factor was present from peacekeeping cases where the factor 
was absent. The number of each quadrant represents the number of cases that correspond to 
those respective criteria. Figure 4 illustrates how the concepts were applied. The upper 
quadrant contains the quantity of cases where the factor was absent, and the peacekeeping 
operation failed. The lower left quadrant represents the number of cases where the factor was 
present, and the operations succeeded. Correspondingly, the upper right quadrant contains the 
number of peacekeeping cases where the factor was present and the operations succeeded; 
while the lower right quadrant represents the number of cases where the factor was present, 
and the operations failed. Factors in the upper right and lower left quadrants support the 
hypothesis, while the factors from the upper left and lower right quadrants undermine the 
hypothesis.  
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Figure 4 Example independent variable group frequency quad-chart  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
3.2.2 Cross tabulation  
The next step in the quantitative analysis is to calculate the frequencies at an in-depth 
level and examine the proportion of cases in each quadrant. This practice will produce insight 
into which factor influences the outcome. To illustrate this process this thesis uses cross-
tabulation charts. These charts are produced initially by using QCA methods but are later 
calculated in Excel so that the results will be easily applied to the discussion chapter. There is 
a single chart for each case sorted by independent variable grouping. The following cross-
tabulation sample shows the occurrence percentages for the frequency data in each case. In 
Table 5, the columns separate the number of cases where the factor was present from the 
number of cases where the factor was absent. Rows of the table indicate the separation of the 
cases of success versus the cases of failure. The four sets of numbers inside of the enclosed 
boxes represent the number of operations, their row percentage, their column percentage, and 
their total percentage respectively. The digits at the end of the table show the column totals 
and the numbers at the far right show the row totals.  
 
Table 5: Example cross-tabulation chart 
 Factor # (f#)  
Outcome NO (0) YES (1)  
SUCCESS (1) 
N 
Row % 
Column % 
Total % 
N 
Row % 
Column % 
Total % 
# SUCCESS 
FAILURE (0) 
N 
Row % 
Column % 
N 
Row % 
Column % 
# FAILURE 
 
Mission outcome 
 
 
     SUCCESS 
 
NO 
f1 
f2 
f3 
f1 
f2 
f3 
YES Factor present 
f1 
f2 
f3 
f1 
f2 
f3 
      FAILURE  
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Total % Total % 
 # NO # YES  
 
 
3.3  QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 
The qualitative analysis consists of crisp and fuzzy set QCA, also used in Watkins’s 
and Paul et al. studies to analyse insurgencies and counter-insurgency (COIN) operations, 
respectively. 129 Given that each study covered more than 70 cases each, this thesis attempts 
to reproduce this approach by suiting it for the analysis of 56 peacekeeping operations.  
QCA is a type of research method that shares three features. As defined by Schneider 
and Wagemann, “first, they work with membership scores of cases in sets; second, they 
perceive relationships between social phenomena as set relations; third, these set relations are 
interpreted in terms of sufficiency and necessity as well as forms of causes that can be 
derived from them […]”130 In other words, QCA is a case-based historical analysis tool 
designed to “access configurations of case similarities and differences using simple logical 
rules.”131 This thesis analyses the crisp and fuzzy sets is a similar way, just instead of using 
71 COIN operations, it studies 56 UN peacekeeping operations.  
As suggested by Carsten Schneider and Claudius Wagemann, the recipe to 
productively use QCA requires 10 steps:  
1. The appropriateness of the set-theoretic methods 
2. The choice of the conditions and the result 
3. The choice of the QCA variable 
4. Calibration of set-membership scores 
5. Analysis of necessary conditions 
6. Analysis of sufficient conditions  
7. Presentation of results 
8. Interpretation of results 
9. Reiteration of the research cycle 
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10. The use of appropriate software132 
Beyond the process itself, Legewie argues that six terms need to be understood. These 
terms are important because they show up in the final QCA results and they are used to 
“gauge the appropriateness of the causal conditions.”133 Those are: 
• A casual recipe—a formula of factors that are combined to explain the outcome 
• Consistency—indicates to what degree the data is in line with the assumed causal 
conditions 
• Raw coverage—indicates the extent to which a specific combination of factors can 
explain the outcome 
• Unique coverage—indicates the number of cases that can be explained exclusively by 
that combination of factors 
• Solution consistency—indicates the combined reliability of all the causal recipes 
• Solution coverage—indicates the combined coverage of all the causal recipes134   
3.2.1  Crisp data 
The Crisp data is used in this study to define the success and failure dependent 
variables. The binary method of the crisp data allows full membership or full non-
membership for each factor. Either the factor is present, or it is absent. This thesis will 
separate each operation into phases so that each case has a single data point for each factor. If 
the factor is observed in 50 percent or more of the phases, the factor is coded as full 
membership. If the factor is observed in less than 50 percent of the phases, it is coded as full 
non-membership. The resulting crisp data is then analysed using the steps described above.  
3.2.2  Fuzzy data 
As Schneider and Wagemann state, a fuzzy dataset is a set, “which allows for partial 
membership, in addition to full membership and full non-membership.”135 In other words, 
within the field of social sciences, it enables the researcher to work with concepts for which 
the establishing of differences in degree among qualitatively similar cases is both 
“conceptually plausible and empirically feasible.”136 
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Factors of the dataset are coded with the percentage of time they are observed. The 
only difference between the fuzzy set data and the crisp set data is the numbers assigned to 
each factor during the case phase combination process. That is, the fuzzy set valuables equal 
the number of phases in which the factor was present, which is then divided by the total 
number of phases in that case. For instance, if only three out of four phases are present in the 
case, the fuzzy set value for that factor would be 75 percent membership. In the crisp set, the 
same factor would equal one because it had more than 50 percent of the phases or more. 
Therefore, fuzzy set QCA produces results that are more precise. This study uses both 
methods to determine the robustness of the findings and hence determine how well these 
findings would apply to other cases.  
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CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION 
 
4.1  KEY FINDINGS  
4.1.1  Evaluating the hypotheses  
This section will review the three hypotheses and the independent variable groups, 
which include several indicators, used to test each premise. This chapter will go on to test the 
robustness of each hypothesis based on the results presented in this section. Overall, the aim 
of this section is to demonstrate how they support or oppose the concepts in the previous 
chapter.  
Hypothesis 1: The peacekeepers require a safe haven from which to operate.   
The independent variable used to test this hypothesis asked whether the peacekeepers 
require a safe and secure environment to successfully implement their objectives. To prove 
this enquiry, this thesis asked whether there were any casualties experienced during the 
course of the mission. The overall result showed that the result of the successful case did not 
deviate significantly given the amount of casualties. In the case of UNAMSIL, the casualties 
phenomenally played an important role to reshape the mission’s objectives and lead to its 
success. Indeed, the May 200 tragedy served as the “necessary evil” for UNAMSIL and its 
successful mandate implementation and establishment of order, procuring the region a 
relatively lasting peace in the aftermath.137 On the other hand, the percentage of the failed 
cases that had the casualties resulted in 83 percent. This may indicate that the factor may not 
have played an important role per se, but it most certainly forced the mission to reconsider its 
strategies. Overall, the factor indicated that even a small amount of deceased personnel is 
highly connected to the mission’s failure criteria. 
Factor 1 asked whether the peacekeepers were deployed into a safe environment, the 
result showed that the successful cases produced the result of 89 percent. Indeed, the initial 
environment for the UNSMIS in Syria proved to be too hostile for the peacekeepers, 
especially given the mission’s small size and capacity. Factor 2 asked whether the 
peacekeepers were targeted as part of the conflict. The result showed that it is not 
                                                          
137 Olonisakin, Funmi. "UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL)." In The Oxford Handbook of UN 
Peacekeeping Operations. 2015. P.7 
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significantly important to the outcome of the cases with 59 percent failed cases with 
peacekeepers experiencing hostilities from the conflicting parties. While it may be true that 
some specific peacekeeping operations did benefit greatly from a reliable and secure haven, 
the assessment of this study demonstrated that the concept is not universal.  
Hypothesis 2: An ample amount of financing does not necessary lead to the mission’s 
success. 
The independent variable used to test this hypothesis question whether the 
peacekeepers received the necessary amount of funding to operate successfully. To support 
the testing of the hypothesis, this study developed an equation to determine the approximate 
amount of financing given to deployed personnel of the mission.  
To calculate the average financing of each operation, this thesis used the statistical 
information derived from the official UN webpages that list the amount of maximum 
deployed personnel and the overall financing that each operation received. The following 
formula used to calculate the average financing per each staff member of each operation was 
conducted in the following manner. First, it divided the maximum amount of personnel in 
each operation including troops and civilian personnel (excluding volunteer staff) by the 
number of months of each operation. Finally, the average amount of time spent by each 
employee was divided by the overall financing of the operation.  
s – total amount of financing of the mission in USD 
p – maximum amount of personnel deployed during the operation 
m – total amount of time of the mission by months 
n – average amount of USD per person per each month of the operation 
(𝑠/𝑝)
𝑚
= 𝑛 
For example, UNYOM had the maximum amount of 189 personnel who spent 10 
months in Yemen with the overall financing of USD $2 million. Therefore, the average 
amount of USD for each member of staff of the UNYOM operation was $1,058. Surely, the 
equipment and the support provided to the peacekeepers would be a significant contribution 
to the calculation, but this thesis relied on the statistical data available from the UN official 
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website. The UNYOM average amount of financing per each staff was conducted in the 
following way: 
($2,000,000/189)
10
= $1,058 
The interesting result of calculating the median amount of financing for each staff of 
successful and failed operations showed a deviation of almost 50 percent. This calculation 
supports the fuzzy set calculations for factors f4-f5. The fuzzy set analysis shows that the two 
factors showed a significant difference between the successful and failed mission at the 
median 40 percent and 8.9 percent, respectively. Therefore, this would suggest that this 
hypothesis is sound: better financing of the operation significantly affects its outcome. 
 
 
Hypothesis 3: The mission needs a sufficient and appropriate amount of personnel 
The next hypothesis focused on the amount of personnel authorised by the UNSC for 
the deployment of the mission. The factors f6-f7 were set to determine whether the mission 
received enough personnel to implement their tasks, and whether the forces were 
appropriately trained and coordinated. The results showed an interesting deviation between 
the successful and failed cases. The successful cases had an average of 70 percent of factors 
f6-f7, while the failed cases had an 83 percent average of not having the factors. Therefore, 
the hypothesis is sound because it plays a significant role in ensuring the success of the 
mandate, order, and lasting peace. Yet, it also plays a strong role for failure if the mission has 
inexperienced and insufficient personnel. Surely, this hypothesis provides a peripheral 
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statement of a mission needing a sufficient and trained personnel. However, cases like 
MINURCAT, which was considered highly over-resourced for the impact it contributed, is 
still considered understaffed, and highly depending on personnel from EUFOR forces. This 
finding provides important information that a peacekeeping mission has to possess enough 
personnel of its own beside being highly financed and supported externally.  
Hypothesis 4: Longer duration of the mission does not necessarily correlate with the success 
of the mission. 
Figure 8 shows few interesting patterns. First, on average, the successful 
peacekeeping operations had longer durations than the failed peacekeeping missions. This 
can be indicated from the successful cases’ curve which is mostly above the failed cases’ 
curve. Second, figure 8 shows that the time distribution for both successes and failures were 
not uniform. Otherwise, the lines would be straighter and more closely aligned with the 
diagonal on the figure. Instead, both curves show that they incline towards the lower right of 
the figure, meaning that some cases lasted a great deal longer than others, disproportionately 
longer. The fuzzy set results proved that hypothesis 4 is sound. Particularly, factor 9, the 
amendment of mandate, showed a great divergence between successful and failed cases by 82 
percent present and 100 percent absent, respectfully.  
Factor 10 proved that it does not play a significant role for the mission’s outcome as 
the premature withdrawal could signify that the mission failed to establish order, hence 
violence escalated. As in the case of UNOMIG’s termination due to the Russo-Georgian War 
in 2008. Or, as in the case of ONUB, the premature withdrawal of the peacekeepers signified 
that Burundi’s government wanted to “assert their sovereignty by refusing the prolonged 
presence of peacekeepers as an obstacle to ‘normali[s]ation’.”138 Therefore, the amendment 
of mandate in accordance to the increase or decrease of violence in the region is a major 
factor to the success of the mission. The worst of examples would be UNPROFOR that 
continued its initial functions amid escalated tensions in the region resulting to the killing of 
5,000 people. UNMISET showed that the premature withdrawal due to its malfunctioning 
mandate also plays and important role for the mission’s outcome.  
Figure 8: duration of successful and failed missions 
                                                          
138 Boutellis, 2015. P.9 
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Hypothesis 5: External support and cooperation with other peacekeeping organisations is 
necessary to ensure the success of the mission 
The last hypothesis tested whether external support and presence of other non-UN 
forces increased the UN peacekeepers’ chances of implementing their objectives, rather than 
acting independently. The variable contains three factors, two of which ask whether the 
mission operated with non-UN organisations, the second, whether the non-UN organisation 
acted independently from the UN mission. Both factors showed relatively strong indicator of 
absence in failure cases of 81 percent and 78, respectively. In the case of MINURCAT, being 
too reliant on a non-UN forces can lead to its failure of implementing the objectives due to 
the limited possibilities to act independently. Overall, the hypothesis can be rejected as the 
presence of non-UN forces does not necessary mean that the UN mission will implement its 
mandate with long-term commitment.   
 
4.1.2  Answering the questions  
In this section, this thesis will try to answer the question posed in the first chapter. So, 
the questions modelled at the beginning of this thesis were: What dynamics play into the 
strategy of the peacekeepers? How can a peacekeeping mission use its limited resources to 
increase its chances of success?  
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The answers to those questions are now more apparent. While the limited resources 
can play a significant factor for the peacekeepers to fail to implement their tasks, it is 
important to not be overambitious or have very little objectives. This study found that the 
large budget or a large number of personnel have much less impact on the outcome that the 
time and effort spent to find the right objective of the mission. Therefore, the UN Secretariat 
must devote just the sufficient resources to have a major impact. This will be done by 
allowing an appropriate number of promptly trained and coordinated personnel with assertive 
tasks that they would be capable of implementing. In addition, ensuring in-depth and in-
breadth knowledge of the situation is necessary for the operation’s success, but this strategy 
may not be sufficient in and of itself. At some point during the mission, the peacekeepers 
may need to show that they can de-escalate the conflict by demonstrating military 
capabilities.  
4.2  BROADER QUALITATIVE FINDINGS  
4.2.1  Frequency analysis 
The first step to test the validity of the 13 independent factors is to look at the 
frequency in which each indicator occurs across the 56 cases. Analysing frequency is the 
quantitative step to identify which factors sturdily support the hypotheses. Chapter 2 
illustrates how the quad-charts operate and how data are allocated. Appending A contains the 
quad-charts of the frequency for each hypothesis. This section will only demonstrate three 
important takeaways from this initial step in the analysis process. Firstly, grouping H1 
illustrates that the peacekeepers require a safe environment to start the operation. The studied 
cases showed that the peacekeepers were deployed into a de-escalated environment that was 
either established by the previous mission or by a non-UN force. While it is apparent that the 
vast amount of peacekeepers require a safe haven to effectively operate, at this point of the 
study it is unclear how it affects the outcome of the mission.  
Secondly, grouping H4 contains three factors that determine how the peacekeepers 
managed the time of the operation. Factor 9 (The mission held an appropriate mandate or 
amended it in case of change of situation) was present in 89 percent of the successful cases, 
while it was 100 percent absent in the failed missions. While the criteria to evaluate the 
missions relied on the implementation of mandate, it did not state whether it was amended or 
not. But this research shows that to successfully contribute to the peace process, the mandate 
must be altered in accordance to the escalation of the situation in the region.  
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Thirdly, grouping H3 shows that the operation required a high amount of personnel to 
ensure the implementation of the given tasks. Yet, quantity does not mean quality. Factors 6 
and 7 ask whether the mission received enough personnel to implement its tasks, and whether 
that personnel was appropriately trained and coordinated. The results show that while the 
successful operations did not always have the appropriate personnel, for example UNAMIC 
that was plagued by language difficulties showed that the personnel was not properly trained 
for the mission, yet, they achieved their tasks. Or, MINUSTAH in Haiti that was able to do 
its job, but a string of sexual assaults from the UN military operatives fuelled an anti-UN 
sentiment in the region. However, the failed cases showed that the peacekeepers were not 
ready for the degree of violence in the region, for example in UNSMIS is Syria or 
UNPROFOR in Bosnia. Therefore, H3 showed some mixed results, but only 17.6 percent of 
the failed cases could claim that they received an appropriate amount of personnel. 
Ultimately, the validity of the factors and the degree to which they support the hypotheses is 
still undermined and this requests a second step in the quantitative process.  
4.2.2  Proportion analysis 
This step in the quantitative analysis process examines the cross-tabulation charts of 
each factor. Chapter 2 illustrated how the cross tabulations work and how they are used. 
Appendix B contains all the cross-tabulation charts for each factor. This method is a good 
way to assess general tendencies across all the cases. Furthermore, as Charles Ragin noted, it 
is a good way of reducing the factors used in the subsequent qualitative steps to only those 
with a high degree of support.139 Table 5 shows an example of a simplified chart between the 
four possible scenarios (cells 1-4) and the validity of the factor’s concept (causal conditions). 
The study of the cross-tabulations charts suggest that out of 13, only 5 concepts have strong 
support and are therefore valid from groupings H1-H4, the H5 grouping concerning external 
support for the operation did not show significant impact on the mission’s outcome. Below 
you can see the description of each valid concept and the indicators that demonstrate the 
assessment.  
 
 
                                                          
139 Charles C. Ragin, Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2008), 21.   
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Table 7: conversional cross-tabulation of presence/absence of an outcome against 
presence/absence of a causal condition140  
 Causal condition absent Causal condition present 
Outcome present Cell 1: cases undermining 
the researcher’s argument 
Cell 2: cases support the 
researcher’s argument 
Outcome absent Cell 3: cases the researcher’s 
argument 
Cell 4: cases undermining 
the researcher’s argument 
 
Factor 1 
 The parts of the area of deployment were secured before-hand the peacekeeping 
mission arrived. The chart for this factor showed that when the operation was a success, 73 
percent of the time, the factor was present. On the other hand, when the operation failed, the 
factor was present only 26.6 percent of the time. This factor is the only indicator from the 
group showing visible effect on the outcome.  
Factor 4  
 When the mission received appropriate equipment and technology the operations 
succeeded 82 percent of the time, and when the peacekeepers lacked the appropriate 
equipment and technology to effectively operate in the area, they succeeded only 41 percent 
of the time. In the failure cases, the factor was present only in 17.8 percent of the time.  
Factor 6  
This factor focused on the number of personnel that was authorised for the mission. 90 
percent of the time, the personnel was sufficient during the successful operations, while only 
10 percent of the failed missions were not experiencing the lack of required personnel.  
Factor 7  
The second factor from grouping H3 enquired whether the personnel received the appropriate 
training and coordination. This factor has a slightly less impact than the previous factor from 
the same group  
Factor 9  
                                                          
140 Ragin, Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond, 21.   
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This factor is seemingly the most influential from all of the five groupings. When the 
mandate was fittingly amended in accordance to the situation in the conflicting region, 94 
percent of the time the missions succeeded. The failed cases show only 5 percent of the times 
when the mandate was adapter to the situation. The failed cases that were determined to have 
converted their mandates by still failed are two. The first is UNIKOM in Kuwait that 
implemented its given tasks in accordance to the situation but failed overall amid the 2003 
US invasion of Iraq. The second mission is UNOMIG that served its purpose during its 
lengthy duties put could not act independently from Russia’s influence in the region and 
failed due to the 2008 Russo-Georgian War. 
4.2.3 Validity Matrix for all factors  
Table 6 illustrates the results of the quantitative findings by assigning a degree of 
support to each factor. In a similar manner to Paul’s et al. study of 24 concepts for COIN 
forces, this thesis tests the 13 factors of the peacekeeping mission in both kind (for or against) 
and degree (strong or weak). Just like in the previous sections, each factor is categorised in 
the order according to its factor number and sorted by independent variable grouping. A brief 
explanation of the factor’s concept is provided in the centre column proceeded by the factor’s 
degree of support. The results produced five levels of support. Strong support for and strong 
support against a factor shows that it had a significant impact on the outcome of the 
peacekeeping mission. No support for or against a factor illustrates that the factor had neither 
a positive nor a negative effect on the outcome of the mission.  
 Only five of the 13 factors analysed displayed strong support for the concept that they 
represented. In fact, four show strong support and one is showing weak support for the 
concept. The one result that is worth mentioning from this analysis is that it is not as 
important have strong international support but it is the way the peacekeepers adapt to the 
situation and act upon. A nominal example for such is UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, which had 
no significant external support after the withdrawal of ECOMOG forces, and experienced the 
May 2000 crisis, but still managed to implement long-lasting peace in the country. 
 
 
 
 
Andrej Sagaidak  SVF-3901 
60 
 
Table 8: validity of all the 13 peacekeeping factors 
VARIABLE 
GROUPING 
FACTOR 
NUMBER 
CONCEPT 
 
H1 f1 The environment was secured before 
the deployment of the peacekeepers 
Strong support for  
H1 f2 The UN peacekeepers were targeted 
by the conflicting groups  
Weak support for 
H1 f3 The UN peacekeepers experienced 
casualties  
Weak support against  
H2 f4 The mission received appropriate 
equipment and technology  
Strong support for  
H2 f5 The personnel were paid fittingly to 
the degree of violence in the region 
Weak support for 
H3 f6 The mission received enough 
personnel to implement its aims 
Strong support for  
H3 f7 The personnel were appropriately 
trained and coordinated  
Strong support for  
H4 f8 The mission was deployed in a 
timely and effective manner  
Weak support for 
H4 f9 The mission held an appropriate 
mandate or amended it in case of 
change of situation  
Strong support for  
H4 f10 The peacekeepers were forced to 
withdraw by the request of the local 
government or due to disagreement 
at the UNSC 
Weak support against 
H5 f11 The mission operated in cooperation 
with non-UN external organisations 
(e.g. NATO, OSCE, AU, etc.) 
Weak support for 
H5 f12 Non-UN external professional 
military engaged in fighting in the 
UN mission’s region 
Weak support against 
H5 f13 Non-UN external support acted 
independently from the UN  
Weak support against 
 
Beside the degree for each factor, the quantitative approach brought to light some 
results that are counterintuitive to some of the assumption that are widely accepted. Firstly, 
there is a weak support that the mission’s outcome depends on the external support from non-
UN peacekeeping forces. When UN mission operated with other organisations, for example 
NATO, AU, or OSCE, f11 (the mission operated along with non-UN organisations) only 55.1 
percent of success cases. When the case was present in the failed mission, the result shows 
44.8 percent. While this numbers do not provide strong support against the necessity of 
external support for the UN peacekeepers, it is counterintuitive because this thesis assumes 
that any external support is vital to the operation’s outcome. A possible explanation could be 
that the forces may fail to cooperate. Yet, the joint missions are a relatively new pattern in the 
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UN peacekeeping. The first officially combined mission is the African Union-UN Hybrid 
Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), which was established only in 2008.141  
Therefore, there is presumably a lot of room for improvement for the joint 
peacekeeping operations to have significant impact on implementing their tasks together. 
Second, the mission can be deployed with all its imperfection, but it must be ready to adopt to 
the given difficulties and limitations in the conflicted area. Indeed, when the conflict starts, 
the peacekeepers must have the ability to amend their original objectives to what occurs in 
the region. Factor 9 showed that this is one of the main reasons why operations fail to secure 
long-lasting peace.  
4.3  BROADER QUALITATIVE FINDINGS 
 The previous section revealed the five concepts that showed strong support. This 
section of the broader findings process determines which combinations of factors have the 
most significant impact on the dependant variable, which represents the success or failure of 
the mission. The QCA approach in this section will reveal a combination of causal recipes. At 
the final stage, the peacekeeping missions’ best and worst practices can be deducted from the 
commonality of factors within these recipes. This thesis suggests that there are no definitive 
recipe for success of a peacekeeping mission. Not a single set of factors nor a specific 
combination of factors can explain success in every case. Yet, this study shows that certain 
factors have more effect that other factors on the outcome of the mission. This study follows 
a similar approach of Paths to Victory that analysed the concepts for COIN operations, and of 
Watkins study of modern insurgencies, only it applies the structure of both studies to the 
assessment of the UN peacekeeping missions.142 To assess the outcomes of the peacekeeping 
missions, this thesis studies approaches of several authors and extracted the criteria illustrated 
in figure 3.143 Those criteria are the implementation of mandate, establishment of order, and 
the enactment of a long-lasting peace in the formerly conflicted region.  
                                                          
141 This mission is not analysed in this thesis because is still on-going 
142 Paul et al., Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies; Watkins, Christopher L. How 
insurgents win: examining the dynamics of modern insurgencies. NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
MONTEREY CA, 2014.  
143 Bratt, Duane. "Assessing the success of UN peacekeeping operations." International Peacekeeping 
3, no. 4 (1996): 64-81 
Diehl, Paul F., and Daniel Druckman. Evaluating peace operations. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010. 
Pushkina; Darya. "A recipe for success? Ingredients of a successful peacekeeping mission." 
International Peacekeeping 13, no. 2 (2006): 139; Van der Lijn, Jaïr. "Success and failure of UN 
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 To illustrate the QCA results in a more comprehensible way than those depicted in 
Appendix 3, this thesis uses a framework developed by Nicholas Legewie.144 This section 
also includes an enhanced table of the QCA results for both the crisp and fuzzy datasets. Each 
table provides the recipe and solution parameters and illustrates the consistency scores, 
coverage scores, and the simplifying norms.  
4.3.1  Crisp set results  
 The data in table 6 demonstrates two of the most important recipes from the crisp set 
analysis. Firstly, when the peacekeepers received enough personnel (f6), who were 
appropriately trained and coordinated (f7), and amended its mandate appropriately (9), the 
peacekeeping operation succeeded at all times. This is crisp set recipe 1. Recipe 1 covers 22 
successful cases our of 38. Recipe 2 combines factors regarding safe haven (f1), appropriate 
equipment and technology (f4), and appropriate mandate amendment. Recipe 2 covers 15 out 
of 38 successful cases. Both recipes have a 100 percent successful score. Yet, exclusively, the 
recipes represent only 13 cases. This means that the unique section contains cases that are 
unique for each recipe and do not overlap between the two. The next section will test whether 
these findings withstand analysis that is more precise. 
Table 6: enhanced table of crisp QCA results 
Recipe parameters  Recipe 1: f6+f7+f9 Recipe 2: f1+f4+f9 
Consistency 1 1 
Raw coverage (# of cases) 0.57 (22) 0.39 (15) 
Unique coverage (# of 
cases) 
0.23 (9) 0.1 (4) 
Solution parameters  All recipes   
consistency 1  
Coverage (# of cases) 0.97 (37)  
Unique coverage (# of cases) 0.34 (13)  
Overlap (# of cases) 0.63 (24)  
 Condition f1 (present) The environment was secured  
 Condition f4 (present) Appropriate equipment and technology  
 Condition f6 (present) Enough personnel  
 Condition f7 (present) Personnel appropriately trained and coordinated  
 Condition f9 (present) Appropriate mandate change  
 
4.3.2  Fuzzy set results  
                                                          
peacekeeping operations: UNMIS in Sudan." Journal of International Peacekeeping 14, no. 1-2 
(2010): 27-59. 
144 Legewie, Nicolas. "An introduction to applied data analysis with qualitative comparative analysis." 
In Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung/Forum: Qualitative Social Research, vol. 14, no. 3. 2013. 
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By observing how these results hold up using the fuzzy set method of QCA, this 
thesis discovered some similarities and some differences. As discussed in Chapter 2, the 
fuzzy data was derived from the same data as the crisp set. However, the fuzzy set QCA 
provides us with the analysis of a higher level of certainty. In the same way as with the crisp 
set results, this approach also reveals two causal recipes with a significant proportion of raw 
coverage. In this table, there is only one recipe, which combines all the five factors (f1, f4, f6, 
f7, f9) and illustrates them to determine the most successful missions out of the 38 set. These 
11 cases are determined as the cases in this study for holding the five most influential factors 
of the peacekeeping operation success. They are: UNOGIL, ONUC, UNSF, UTAG, ONICA, 
UNAMIC, UNAMSIL, ONUB, UMIS, and UNMIT. 
Table 7: Enhanced table of Fuzzy QCA results  
Recipe parameters  Recipe 1: f1+f4+ f6+f7+f9  
Consistency 1  
Raw coverage (# of cases) 0.29 (11)  
Unique coverage (# of cases) 0.29 (11)  
Solution parameters    
consistency 1  
Coverage (# of cases) 0.29 (11)  
Unique coverage (# of cases) 0.29 (11)  
Overlap (# of cases) 0  
 Condition f1 (present) The environment was secured  
 Condition f4 (present) Appropriate equipment and technology  
 Condition f6 (present) Enough personnel  
 Condition f7 (present) Personnel appropriately trained and 
coordinated  
 Condition f9 (present) Appropriate mandate change  
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CHAPTER 5:  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
5.1 CONCLUSION 
 The peacekeeping planners’ efforts should focus on generating a moderate 
mandate for a mission, but keep in mind that it will need to be adapted as soon as the blue-
helmets get deployed to the conflicting environment. This study also showed that the five 
most important factors that lead to the mission’s implementation of mandate, establishment 
of order, and ensuring a long-lasting peace. Those factors are: (1) a safe and secure haven for 
the peacekeepers to operate; (2) the procurement of appropriate equipment and technology 
for the peacekeepers; (3) a sufficient number of personnel to cover all the fields of work; (4) 
ensure that the personnel is appropriately trained for the specific mission; and (5) ability to 
adapt its objectives as soon as the situation changes in the region. In addition, the results 
showed that the conjoint operation with non-UN peacekeepers does not necessarily lead to 
the successful outcome of the mission due to possible conflicts of interest or failed 
communication. One of the notable example is MINURCAT that failing to establish liaison 
with EURFOR. 
Above all, this thesis found that the amendment of the mandate is the most important 
factor that lead to the success of the mission. Indeed, as we discussed in the cases evaluation 
section, UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone experienced a devastating crisis that had several 
peacekeepers killed and 5,000 taken hostage. Yet, the mission overhauled due to the crisis 
and solidified its position within the notably successful operations. In addition, MINUGUA 
also ensured its success by changing its mandate several times.  
This study started by evaluating 56 peacekeeping mission by three criteria: 
implementation of mandate, establishment of order, and ensuring long-lasting peace. The 
results showed 39 successful cases and 17 failed cases. The thesis used both qualitative and 
quantitative methods to analyse the cases and determine what factors played the most 
important role for the mission to be evaluated as a success or failure. Most notably, while 
mission like UNOSOM I or UNOMIG failed to implement their mandates hence falling 
under the failure criteria, other missions like UNCRO, initially implemented their limited 
mandate, but the subsequent resumption of violence compromised the UN’s efforts in the 
region. 
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Overall, this study found that the combination of factors 1, 4, 6, 7, and 8 is one of the 
best recipes to ensure a successful outcome of the peacekeeping mission. Therefore, those 
variables show a stong correlation between the peacekeeping mission’s dynamics and its 
outcome, proving that some factors are much more influential than others. Table 9 is a 
summary of the results presented throughout this thesis.  
Table 9: summary of results 
Hypothesis 
/factor 
Concept and valid peacekeeping factors Results 
H1 The peacekeepers require a safe haven 
from which to operate.   
Sound  
f1 The environment was secured before the 
deployment of the peacekeepers 
Strong support for  
f2 The UN peacekeepers were targeted by the 
conflicting groups  
Weak support for 
f3 The UN peacekeepers experienced 
casualties  
Weak support against  
H2 Bigger amount of funding for the mission 
does not necessary lead to its success. 
Sound  
f4 The mission received appropriate equipment 
and technology  
Strong support for  
f5 The personnel were paid fittingly  Weak support for 
H3 the mission needs a necessary amount of 
personnel to ensure the implementation 
of its objectives 
Sound  
f6 The mission received enough personnel to 
implement its aims 
Strong support for  
f7 The personnel were appropriately trained 
and coordinated  
Strong support for  
H4 Longer duration of the mission does not 
necessarily correlate with the success of 
the mission. 
Sound  
f8 The mission was deployed in a timely and 
effective manner  
Weak support for 
f9 The mission held an appropriate mandate or 
amended it in case of change of situation  
Strong support for  
f10 The peacekeepers were forced to withdraw 
by the request of the local government or 
due to disagreement at the UNSC 
Weak support against 
H5 External support and presence of other 
peacekeeping forces are necessary to 
increase the UN mission’s implementation 
of objectives 
Unsound  
f11 The mission operated in cooperation with 
non-UN external organisations (e.g. NATO, 
OSCE, AU, etc.) 
Strong support for 
f12 Non-UN external professional military 
engaged in fighting in the UN mission’s 
region 
Strong support against 
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f13 Non-UN external support acted 
independently from the UN  
Weak support against 
5.2  QUESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
To ensure reliability and allow future researchers to repeat a similar strategy to 
analyse a social phenomena, this section provides a set of suggestions for future studies using 
the same technique. The data collected for these 56 cases will support analyses that go well 
beyond those reported in this thesis. And should future inquiry require data that are not yet 
available, for example information on future peacekeeping operations, additional variables 
could be added relatively easily. Below, you can find some questions that future studies 
would want to investigate.  
What factors lead to peacekeeping operations success? 
All the data analysed in this study investigated what factors influenced the outcome of 
the mission. Although the evaluations in this thesis considered a set of factors that lead to an 
operation’s success, those factors can be redefined to determine the best practices in 
accordance to new cases. 
When should a peacekeeping operations end? 
While this study focused on the best and worst practices of the peacekeeping 
operations, once that outcome is secure, the subsequent events may change the outcome of 
the operation, as conflict resumes shortly after. The questions remain, what is the degree of 
commitment in relations to its budget that an operation should have? What are the conditions 
that will likely minimise the probability of the resumption of a conflict? What are the DDR 
approaches that the peacekeepers should prioritise? 
How many personnel are required? 
One of the main pinnacles from this research is that an operations needs appropriate funding 
and enough personnel to implement its targets. So how many armed troops are necessary? 
This study collected the maximum amount of personnel deployed during the peacekeeping 
operation. The result from figure 4 suggests that the failed peacekeeping missions had just 
above half of financing provided for the amount of personnel. Therefore, the result suggests 
that the quality of the peacekeeping operations is more important than quantity. 
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APPENDIX 1:  CASES OUTCOMES 
 
Table 1: UN peacekeeping missions and their outcomes 
 ACRONYM MISSION NAME DATE SPAN OUTCOME 
1.  UNEF I  First UN Emergency Force Nov 1956-Jun 1967  Case success 
2.  UNOGIL  UN Observation Group in Lebanon Jun 1958 Dec 1958  Case success 
3.  ONUC  UN Operation in the Congo Jul 1960-Jun 1964  Case success 
4.  UNSF  UN Security Force in West New 
Guinea 
Oct 1962-Apr 1963  Case success 
5.  UNYOM  UN Yemen Observation Mission Jul 1963-Sep 1964  Case failure 
6.  DOMREP  Mission of the Representative of the 
Secretary-General in the Dominican 
Republic 
May 1965-Oct 1966  Case success 
7.  UNIPOM  UN India-Pakistan Observation 
Mission 
Sep1965-Mar 1966  Case success 
8.  UNEF II  Second UN Emergency Force Oct 1973-Jul 1979  Case success 
9.  UNGOMAP  UN Good Offices Mission in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan 
May 1988-Mar 1990  Case failure 
10.  UNIIMOG  UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group Aug 1988-Feb 1991  Case success 
11.  UNAVEM I  UN Angola Verification Mission I Jan 1989-Jun 1991  Case success 
12.  UNTAG  UN Transition Assistance Group Apr 1989-Mar 1990  Case success 
13.  ONUCA  UN Observer Group in Central 
America 
Nov 1989-Jan 1992  Case success 
14.  UNIKOM  UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission Apr 1991-Oct 2003  Case success 
15.  UNAVEM II  UN Angola Verification Mission II Jun 1991-Feb 1995  Case failure 
16.  ONUSAL  UN Observer Mission in El Salvador Jul 1991-Apr 1995  Case success 
17.  UNAMIC  UN Advance Mission in Cambodia Oct 1991-Mar 1992  Case success  
18.  UNPROFOR  UN Protection Force Feb 1992-Mar 1995  Case failure 
19.  UNTAC  UN Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia 
Mar 1992-Sep 1993  Case success 
20.  UNOSOM I  UN Operation in Somalia I Apr 1992-Mar 1993  Case failure 
21.  ONUMOZ  UN Operation in Mozambique Dec 1992-Dec 1994  Case success 
22.  UNOSOM II  UN Operation in Somalia II Mar 1993-Mar 1995  Case failure 
23.  UNOMUR  UN Observer Mission Uganda-
Rwanda 
Jun 1993-Sep 1994  Case failure  
24.  UNOMIG  UN Observer Mission in Georgia Aug 1993-Jun 2009  Case failure 
25.  UNOMIL  UN Observer Mission in Liberia Sep 1993-Sep 1997  Case success 
26.  UNMIH  UN Mission in Haiti Sep 1993-Jun 1996  Case success 
27.  UNAMIR  UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda Oct 1993-Mar 1996 Case failure 
28.  UNASOG  UN Aouzou Strip Observer Group May 1994-Jun 1994  Case success 
29.  UNMOT  UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan Dec1994-May 2000  Case success 
30.  UNAVEM III UN Angola Verification Mission III Feb 1995-Jun 1997 Case failure 
31.  UNCRO  UN Confidence Restoration Operation 
in Croatia 
May 1995-Jan 1996  Case failure 
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 ACRONYM MISSION NAME DATE SPAN OUTCOME 
32.  UNPREDEP  UN Preventive Deployment Force Mar 1995-Feb 1999  Case success 
33.  UNMIBH  UN Mission in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Dec1995-Dec2002  Case success  
34.  UNTAES  UN Transitional Administration for 
Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western 
Sirmium 
Jan 1996-Jan 1998  Case success 
35.  UNMOP  UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka Jan 1996-Dec2002  Case success 
36.  UNSMIH  UN Support Mission in Haiti Jul 1996-Jul 1997  Case success 
37.  MINUGUA  UN Verification Mission in Guatemala Jan 1997-May 1997  Case success 
38.  MONUA  UN Observer Mission in Angola Jun 1997-Feb 1999  Case failure 
39.  UNTMIH  UN Transition Mission in Haiti Aug 1997-Dec1997  Case success  
40.  MIPONUH  UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti Dec1997-Mar 2000  Case failure  
41.  UNCPSG  UN Civilian Police Support Group Jan 1998-Oct 1998  Case success  
42.  MINURCA  UN Mission in the Central African 
Republic 
Apr 1998-Feb 2000  Case success 
43.  UNOMSIL  UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone Jul 1998-Oct 1999  Case success 
44.  UNAMSIL  UN Mission in Sierra Leone Oct 1999-Dec2005  Case success 
45.  UNTAET  UN Transitional Administration in 
East Timor 
Oct 1999-May 2002  Case success  
46.  MONUC  UN Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo 
Nov 1999-Jun 2010  Case success 
47.  UNMEE  UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea Jul 2000-Jul 2008  Case failure 
48.  UNMISET  UN Mission of Support in East Timor May 2002-May 2005 Case failure 
49.  MINUCI  UN Mission in Côte d’Ivoire May 2003-Apr 2004 Case success  
50.  UNOCI  UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire Apr 2004-Jun 2017 Case success  
51.  MINUSTAH  UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti Jun 2004-Oct 2017 Case success 
52.  ONUB  UN Operation in Burundi Jun 2004-Dec2006  Case success  
53.  UNMIS  UN Mission in the Sudan Mar 2005-Jul 2011  Case success 
54.  UNMIT  UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste Aug 2006-Dec2012 Case success  
55.  MINURCAT  UN Mission in the Central African 
Republic and Chad 
Sep 2007-Dec2010 Case failure 
 
56.  UNSMIS  UN Supervision Mission in Syria Apr 2012-Aug 2012  Case failure  
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APPENDIX 2:  FREQUENCY QUAD-CHARTS 
 
This appendix contains the frequency quad-charts for all factors grouped with their 
relevant hypothesis. Figures 3-6 divide cases of peacekeeping operation success from the 
cases of peacekeeping operations failure in the X-axis. The Y-axis divides the cases where 
the factor was present from cases where the factor was absent. The number in each quadrant 
represents the quantity of cases that meet those respected criteria. as explained in section 3.2 
of Chapter 3, the upper left quadrant contains the number of cases where the factor was 
absent, and the peacekeeping operation succeeded; the lower left quadrant contains the 
number of cases where the factor was absent and the peacekeeping operation failed. 
Conversely, the upper right quadrant contains the quantity of cases where the factor was 
present, and the peacekeeping operation succeeded; while the lower right quadrant contains 
the quantity of cases where the factor was present, but the peacekeeping operation failed.  
Figure 6: H1 frequency Quad-Chart 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: H2 frequency Quad-Chart 
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Figure 8: H3 frequency Quad-Chart 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: H4 frequency Quad-Chart 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: H5 frequency Quad-Chart 
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APPENDIX 3.  CROSS-TABULATIONS 
 
This appendix contains cross-tabulations that illustrate the occurrence percentages for 
the frequency data in each case. As explained in section 3.2.1, the tables contain columns that 
separate the number of cases where the factor was present from cases where the factor was 
absent. The four sets of numbers inside of the enclosed boxes represent the number of cases, 
their row percentage, their column percentage, and their total percentage, respectably. The 
digits at the end of each column show the column totals and the numbers at the far right show 
the row totals.  
Factors within grouping H1 
 
 Factor (f1)  
Outcome NO (0) YES (1)  
SUCCESS (1) 
5 
13% 
45.5% 
9% 
33 
89% 
73% 
59% 
38 
FAILURE (0) 
6 
33.3% 
54.5% 
10.7% 
12 
66.6% 
26.6% 
21.4% 
18 
 11 45  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Factor (f2)  
Outcome NO (0) YES (1)  
SUCCESS (1) 
26 
66.6% 
72.2 % 
46.4 % 
13 
33.3% 
65% 
23.2 % 
39 
FAILURE (0) 
10 
58.8 % 
27.7 % 
17.8 % 
7 
41.1 % 
35 % 
12.5 % 
17 
 36 20  
 Factor (f3)  
Outcome NO (0) YES (1)  
SUCCESS (1) 
18 
46.1 % 
85.7 % 
32.1 % 
21 
53.8 % 
60 % 
37.5 % 
39 
FAILURE (0) 
3 
17.6 % 
14.2 % 
5.3 % 
14 
82.3 % 
40 % 
25 % 
17 
 21 35  
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Factors within grouping H2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Factors within grouping H3 
 
 Factor (f6)  
Outcome NO (0) YES (1)  
SUCCESS (1) 
12 
30.7 % 
46.1 % 
21.4 % 
27 
69.2 % 
90 % 
48.2 % 
39 
FAILURE (0) 
14 
82.3 % 
53.8 % 
2 % 
3 
17.6 % 
10 % 
5.3 % 
17 
 26 30  
 
 
  
 Factor (f4)  
Outcome NO (0) YES (1)  
SUCCESS (1) 
16 
41 % 
57 % 
28.5 % 
23 
59 % 
82.1 % 
41 % 
39 
FAILURE (0) 
12 
70.5 % 
42.8 % 
21.4 % 
5 
29.4 % 
17.8 % 
8.9 % 
17 
 28 28  
 Factor (f5)  
Outcome NO (0) YES (1)  
SUCCESS (1) 
15 
38.4 % 
55.5 % 
26.7 % 
24 
61.5 % 
82.7 % 
42.8 % 
39 
FAILURE (0) 
12 
70.5 % 
44.4 % 
21.4 % 
5 
29.4 % 
17.2 % 
8.9 % 
17 
 27 29  
 Factor (f7)  
Outcome NO (0) YES (1)  
SUCCESS (1) 
12 
42.8 % 
46.1 % 
21.4 % 
16 
57.1 % 
53.3 % 
28.5 % 
28 
FAILURE (0) 
14 
50 % 
53.8 % 
25 % 
14 
50 % 
46.6 % 
25 % 
28 
 26 30  
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Factors within grouping H4 
 
 Factor (f8)  
Outcome NO (0) YES (1)  
SUCCESS (1) 
3 
7.5 % 
37.5 % 
5.3 % 
37 
92.2 % 
77 % 
66 % 
40 
FAILURE (0) 
5 
31.2 % 
62.5 % 
8.9 % 
11 
68.7 % 
22.9 % 
19.6 % 
16 
 8 48  
 
 Factor (f10)  
Outcome NO (0) YES (1)  
SUCCESS (1) 
37 
90.2 % 
75.5 % 
66 % 
4 
9.7 % 
57.1 % 
7.1 % 
41 
FAILURE (0) 
12 
80 % 
24.4 % 
21.4 % 
3 
20 % 
42.8 % 
5.3 % 
15 
 49 7  
 
  
 Factor (f9)  
Outcome NO (0) YES (1)  
SUCCESS (1) 
7 
17 % 
31.8 % 
12.5 % 
32 
78 % 
94 % 
57 % 
41 
FAILURE (0) 
15 
100 % 
68.1 % 
26.7 % 
2 
13.3 % 
5 % 
3.5 % 
15 
 22 34  
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Factors within grouping H5 
 
 Factor (f11)  
Outcome NO (0) YES (1)  
SUCCESS (1) 
24 
60 % 
88.8 % 
42.8 % 
16 
40 % 
55.1 % 
28.5 % 
40 
FAILURE (0) 
3 
18.7 % 
11.1 % 
5.3 % 
13 
81.2 % 
44.8 % 
23.2 % 
16 
 27 29  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Factor (f12)  
Outcome NO (0) YES (1)  
SUCCESS (1) 
26 
68.4 % 
86.6 % 
46.4 % 
12 
31.5 % 
46.1 % 
21.4 % 
38 
FAILURE (0) 
4 
22.2 % 
13.3 
7.1 % 
14 
77.7 % 
53.8 % 
25 % 
18 
 30 26  
 Factor (f13)  
Outcome NO (0) YES (1)  
SUCCESS (1) 
18 
46.1 % 
78.2 % 
32.1 % 
21 
53.8 % 
63.6 % 
37.5 % 
39 
FAILURE (0) 
5 
29.4 % 
21.7 % 
8.9 % 
12 
70.5 % 
36.3 % 
21.4 % 
17 
 23 33  
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APPENDIX 4:  LIST OF 13 FACTORS 
 
 
Table 8: validity of all the 13 peacekeeping factors 
VARIABLE 
GROUPING 
FACTOR 
NUMBER 
CONCEPT 
 
H1 f1 The environment was secured before 
the deployment of the peacekeepers 
Strong support for  
H1 f2 The UN peacekeepers were targeted 
by the conflicting groups  
Weak support for 
H1 f3 The UN peacekeepers experienced 
casualties  
Weak support against  
H2 f4 The mission received appropriate 
equipment and technology  
Strong support for  
H2 f5 The personnel were paid fittingly to 
the degree of violence in the region 
Weak support for 
H3 f6 The mission received enough 
personnel to implement its aims 
Strong support for  
H3 f7 The personnel were appropriately 
trained and coordinated  
Strong support for  
H4 f8 The mission was deployed in a 
timely and effective manner  
Weak support for 
H4 f9 The mission held an appropriate 
mandate or amended it in case of 
change of situation  
Strong support for  
H4 f10 The peacekeepers were forced to 
withdraw by the request of the local 
government or due to disagreement 
at the UNSC 
Weak support against 
H5 f11 The mission operated in cooperation 
with non-UN external organisations 
(e.g. NATO, OSCE, AU, etc.) 
Weak support for 
H5 f12 Non-UN external professional 
military engaged in fighting in the 
UN mission’s region 
Weak support against 
H5 f13 Non-UN external support acted 
independently from the UN  
Weak support against 
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